Vanderbilt University Law School

Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2017

Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing
Boards Up Close
Rebecca Haw Allensworth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Commercial Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up Close, 105 California Law Review. 1567 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse:
Occupational Licensing Boards up Close, 105 Cal. L.
Rev. 1567 (2017)
Provided by:
Vanderbilt University Law School
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Mon Feb 5 15:44:56 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

California Law Review
VOL. 105

DECEMBER 2017

No. 6

Copyright 0 2017 by California Law Review, Inc., a California Nonprofit Corporation

Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational
Licensing Boards Up Close
Rebecca Haw Allensworth*
The dark side of occupational licensing-its tendency to raise

prices to consumers with dubious effects on service quality, its
enormous payout to licensees, and its ability to shut many willing
workers out of the workforce-has begun to receive significant
attention. But little has been said about the legal institutions that
create and administer this web of professional entry and practice
rules. State-level licensing boards regulate nearly one-third of
American workers, yet, until now, there has been no systematic attempt
to understandwho serves on these boards and how they operate. This
Article undertakes an ambitious and comprehensive study of all 1,790
licensing boards in the U.S. and identifies theirstatutory membership.
The results are clear: nearly all of them are controlled by
professionalsholding a license issued by the board itself
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This self-regulation is disturbing enough if one expects at least
some governmental involvement in decisions that are known to
redistribute income, block labor entry, and harm consumers. But now
the practitioner-dominated licensing board is notjust an urgent policy
problem, but a legal one. A recent Supreme Court case has placed
these boards and their members in the crosshairs of federal antitrust
liability, precipitating a legal crisis for the states. This Article
identifies the enormous scope of the Court's opinion in North Carolina
State Board ofDental Examiners v. FTC, opines on the meaning of its
somewhat cryptic holding, and suggests steps that states can take to
reform their boards with an eye to both antitrust immunity and more
reasonable occupational regulation.
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INTRODUCTION

Any given state-level occupational licensing board is nearly invisible. This
is true despite the fact that, together, 1,790 such boards form the most important
labor institution in the country, controlling whether and how almost 30 percent
of Americans work' and despite the fact that a movement against wasteful
occupational licensing rules and regulations is gaining steam. 2 And it is still true
even after a recent Supreme Court case put them in the crosshairs of antitrust
litigation. 3 They are invisible because they are so numerous-most states have
several dozen boards, some have more4-and because the public impact of any
single board is relatively small. Their power to raise price, to create service
scarcity, and to limit gainful employment is apparent only in the aggregate:
together, they cost American consumers an estimated $116 billion dollars a
year.5

1. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of
OccupationalLicensing on the LaborMarket, 31 J. LAB. ECON. S173, S198 (2013) (estimating that, as
of 2008, 29 percent of U.S. workers were licensed and noting that licensing is a growing phenomenon
in the U.S. economy).
2. The issue has recently received significant attention from the federal government in the form
of a Senate hearing, see License to Compete: OccupationalLicensing and the State Action Doctrine:
Cong.
(2016),
Judiciary,
114th
Comm.
on
the
the
S.
Hearing Before
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/license-to-compete-occupational-licensing-and-the-stateaction-doctrine [https://perma.cc/RYK8-9FNX], and a White House report, see DEP'T OF TREASURY,
OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS (2015),

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensingreport fmal nonembargo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5R7Q-QDP2]. It has also captured media attention. See, e.g., Patricia Cohen, Moving
to Arizona Soon? You Might Need a License, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2016),
[https://perma.cc/7UE5https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/18/business/economy/job-licenses.html
CQ6B]; Josh Zumbrun, OccupationalLicenses May be Badfor the Economy, But Goodfor Workers
Who
Have
Them,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
18,
2016),
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2016/04/18/occupational-licenses-may-be-bad-for-the-economy-butgood-for-workers-who-have-them [https://perma.cc/928B-H24M].
3. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
4. The average state has thirty-nine boards; Alabama and Texas are tied for the most boards,
with forty-nine each. See Appendix.
5.

See MORRIS

M.

KLEINER,

LICENSING

OCCUPATIONS:

ENSURING

QUALITY

OR

RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 115 (2006) (estimating the cost of occupational licensing to consumers at
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That occupational licensing goes too far, at the expense of consumers and
entrepreneurs, has been a source of frequent and high-profile criticism from
economists and policymakers for decades. Indeed, there is widespread
agreement that many professions-such as beekeeping, fortune telling, and hair
shampooing-ought not to be licensed at all. And there is a growing consensus
among economists that even professions for which some licensing requirements
are appropriate-such as law and medicine-are inefficiently regulated in ways
that increase wages without addressing quality. But in contrast to what is known
about the effect of onerous occupational licensing requirements, much less is
known about the hundreds of state-level boards that are responsible for creating
and enforcing those requirements.
A fifty-state, in-depth survey of these boards-which together make up the
most powerful labor institution in the United States-is long overdue. This
Article fills that gap by identifying all 1,790 state occupational licensing boards
and describing their statutory composition. 6 The results of this comprehensive
survey may be disturbing to those under the impression that occupational
regulation is governmental, which is to say that it is in any measure public or
public-regarding. The dirty secret behind occupational licensing boards is that
very little of what they do resembles governmental activity.
My research reveals that of the 1,790 total boards, 1,515, or 85 percent, are
required by statute to be comprised of a majority of currently licensed
professionals, active in the very profession the board regulates. This
overwhelming degree of self-regulation would be bad enough, but further
research into the actual practices of these boards-from rules that
nonprofessional board members cannot vote,' to chronic vacancies and absences
of nonprofessional board members,8 to violations of their organic statutes
shows that professional dominance on boards exceeds even this large percentage:
it is nearly universal. Thin or nonexistent supervision from the states means that
the licensed sector of the American workforce is almost entirely self-regulating.
Such self-regulation may allow for expertise in decision making, but it comes at
0
a very high price in the form of professional self-dealing.1
These facts about state licensing boards have triggered a legal crisis in the
wake of the Supreme Court's recent decision in North CarolinaBoardofDental

$116-$139 billion a year by using an econometrically derived licensing wage premium to measure the
reallocation of wealth from consumers-in the form of higher-priced services-to practitioners-in the
form of higher wages).
6. For a summary of my empirical findings, see Appendix.
7. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
10. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartelsby Another Name: ShouldLicensed Occupations
FaceAntitrustScrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1104-10 (2014) (discussing a range of examples of
self-dealing occupational regulation created by mostly professionally dominated boards).
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Examiners v. FTC. 1 In that case, the Court held that "a state board on which a
controlling number of decisionmakers are active market participants in the
occupation the board regulates" must be actively supervised by the state or else
face antitrust lawsuits brought by private parties and government enforcers. 1 2
Because few states even arguably supervise their boards, and because, as my
research reveals, "active market participants" control almost every board, states
are confronting a serious threat to their coffers and to the way they regulate
millions of workers.
North Carolina Dental prompted two responses: (1) a barrage of antitrust
lawsuits against licensing boards,13 and (2) a panic among state officials seeking
ways to immunize their boards from further suit. In addition to empirically
identifying the scope of states' legal exposure, this Article also provides
guidance on how states may reform board composition to avoid the active
supervision requirement. I explore the range of possible meanings of "controlling
number of ...
active market participants," from the formal, conservative
definition I used in my empirical research to a nuanced, case-by-case definition
of professional dominance. I advocate for-and predict the Court will ultimately
adopt-a definition that both allows states to enjoy safe harbor though board
composition and prevents them from using procedural machinations to pass off
the status quo as real reform.
This Article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I describe my empirical results,
which reveal a picture of almost total self-regulation in licensed occupations.
Here I discuss my comprehensive survey of all state statutes that create licensing
boards, as well as the selective investigations I conducted into the on-the-ground
operation of boards, as revealed by their websites and minutes. Part II describes
the legal crisis precipitated by North Carolina Dental, surveying the lawsuits
that have been filed since the case was handed down in 2015. This Part also
provides a primer on the legal issues that underlie these suits-antitrust's "state
action immunity" doctrine and the Sherman Act's prohibition on unreasonable
restraints of trade. Part III discusses the next legal frontier as lower courts
struggle to interpret "controlling number of ... active market participants."
Finally, Part IV explains the urgent need for states to make changes in how they
regulate the professions, and lays out a plan for how to reform boards into fairer
and more efficient institutions while avoiding antitrust scrutiny of their
decisions.

11.
12.
13.

135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).
Id. at 1114.
See infra notes 49-72 and accompanying text.
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I.
MOST PROFESSIONAL LICENSING BOARDS ARE CONTROLLED BY LICENSE
HOLDERS

In North CarolinaDental, the Court held that a board with a majority of
currently licensed, practicing dentists is controlled by "active market
participants" and thus requires active state supervision to qualify for immunity
from antitrust suit. 14 Just how many licensing boards share this structure of selfregulation, where licensees form the majority of the board? Although this
question goes to the heart of how a large portion of the American workforce is
regulated, it has not been answered until now. My fifty-state survey reveals that
the board structure in North Carolina Dental is far from exceptional-85
percent, or 1,515 boards, are required by statute to be comprised of a majority of
currently practicing license holders. This study confirms that North Carolina
Dental, and its requirement that dominated boards be supervised or face antitrust
liability, reaches deep into the most powerful labor institution in the country.
A.

EmpiricalResults: Competitor Control

I surveyed all the state statutes creating licensing boards and developed a
comprehensive list of boards and their statutory requirements for membership. I
defined "state occupational licensing board" as a substate entity created by
statute and tasked with regulating occupational licensing, typically by creating
and enforcing entry and practice regulations. 15 "Regulating" included both
creating self-executing rules-rules that by statute have the force of law without
further action by another entity-and acting in an advisory capacity for another
state regulator. The majority of boards have direct rulemaking authority.16
I defined "occupational licensing" as the imposition of educational,
experiential, or examination requirements as a precondition of lawful provision
of a service. Thus, I excluded boards that oversaw a certification schemewhereby a practitioner without certification is prohibited from representing
himself as "certified" but uncertified practice is lawful.1 7 Similarly, I excluded
boards that established a "title use" scheme, where an individual is prohibited
from using a professional title such as "accountant" without meeting some
governmentally imposed requirements, but not prohibited from providing
service identical to that of a titleholder. The survey also excluded boards that
14. NC State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
15. Private regulatory bodies such as state bar associations were excluded because they were
not created by state statute. This choice obviously excluded additional practitioner-dominated regulatory
entities, and therefore is another example where my study understates the degree of self-regulation
among the professions.
16.
Approximately 1,397 boards, or 78 percent, are explicitly granted by statute the authority to
create rules.
17.
See KLEINER, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that in a certification scheme, "any person can
perform the relevant tasks, but the government or ... nonprofit agency administers an examination and
certifies those who have passed").
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outlawed practice without government approval but that did not impose
significant educational, experiential, or examination requirements-such as
schemes where workers must merely register with the government and pay a
fee. 8 Finally, I excluded business licenses, such as a license to operate a
restaurant, because they did not attach to an individual (and because they often
did not require education, examination, or experience).1 9 These definitions of
"occupational licensing" comport with other work in the field, including
empirical studies of the economic effects of licensure. 20 Not all statutes use
words like "license" or "certification" in the ways I define them; thus, it was
necessary to interpret the individual statutes to determine a board's status.
To ensure that I captured all state licensing boards, I cross-referenced
boards found in statutes with official governmental websites identifying the
professional boards and regulated professions in a state. Both statutes and
websites identified some boards that did not meet my criteria, but the use of
governmental websites helped identify boards created in a corner of the state
statutory code that I had not examined-not all states have well-organized codes.
For each board, I listed the professional licenses it was tasked with regulating.
In many cases, a board issues several different professional licenses, as when a
medical board licenses physicians and chiropractors, or a nursing board licenses
registered nurses and advanced practice registered nurses. 21
I recorded the statutory membership requirements for all 1,790 boards. 22
Where a board was comprised of a majority of license holders, it was coded as
"dominated." Where a board issued more than one kind of license, I counted all
such license holders toward dominance. But if no single type of licensee made
up a majority of the board, yet all licensees counted together did make up a
majority, that board was recorded as "mixed" as well as "dominated." For
example, I recorded a dental board comprised of five licensed dentists, two
licensed dental hygienists, and two consumer members as dominated but not

&

18. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-16-105 (2016) (registration of athlete agents); CAL. Bus.
PROF. CODE § 22350 (2016) (process servers); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:19-11 (West 2016) (private
detectives); WASH. REv. CODE § 18.44.031 (2016) (escrow agents).
19. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 468M-2 (2016) (arrangers of air, land, or sea tours); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32, § 14053 (2016) (employee leasing companies); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 325-A:2 (2016)
(crematories); N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 96-b (McKinney 2016) (slaughterhouses); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4712.02 (West 2016) (credit services organizations); VA. CODE ANN. § 35.1-18 (2016)
(hotels and restaurants).
20. See KLEINER, supra note 5, at 2-3, 6-7 (describing characteristics of professional licensing).
21. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/8 (2016) (establishing medical board to regulate physicians
and chiropractors); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-03 (2015) (providing for licensing of advanced practice
registered nurses, specialty practice registered nurses, registered nurses, and licensed practical nurses).
22. I chose to measure professional dominance using statutory requirements in part because it
was easier to measure. Determining actual dominance would require looking up the current members of
each board and determining their occupational status; this information is not always available and
certainly not centrally located. I also chose to use statutory dominance because it represented a
conservative measure. If the overwhelming number of boards must be dominated by law, then a priori
the overwhelming majority of boards are most likely dominated in fact.
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mixed.23 By contrast, I recorded a veterinary board comprised of four
veterinarians, one veterinary technician, and three public members, as mixed and
dominated, since neither veterinarians nor technicians alone constituted a
majority. 24 A board member holding a license not issued by the board-for
example, a physician serving on an acupuncture board-did not count toward
dominance.25 Where licensing status was ambiguous, for example, where a
statute required "experience" in the profession but not explicitly a license, that
26
member was not counted toward dominance.
The results of the study are stark. Eighty-five percent of occupational
licensing boards in the United States are dominated by workers holding a license
issued by the board itself. In other words, the holding of North CarolinaDental
probably applies to at least 1,515 boards. Only about 16 percent of boards are
dominated and mixed, meaning that even a conservative definition of
dominance-one that only counts one kind of licensee toward North Carolina
Dental's "controlling number"-would yield about 69 percent, or 1,239 boards
subject to the Court's requirement that boards be supervised or face antitrust
scrutiny. And this is only based on the dominance created as a matter of law.
Because actual board membership can differ from the minimum statutory
requirements, and because not all board members actually attend and vote at
every meeting, these figures likely understate-perhaps dramatically-the
amount of self-regulation that passes as state occupational licensing.
B.

The Reality ofBoardMeetings: Even More Competitor Control

Recognizing that the statutory requirements for membership are only part
of the story, I also reviewed hundreds of minutes that had been posted online for
over eighty licensing boards, or about 5 percent of the total number of boards in
the country. I discovered that it was common for a board to have one or more
vacancies, some long-standing. 27 These vacancies were disproportionately layor consumer-member positions. In many instances, vacancies created
professional dominance on a board we had not coded as dominated. For example,
the Connecticut State Board of Examiners of Shorthand Reporters has left a lay
member seat vacant for five years, allowing shorthand reporters to enjoy
majority status at most of their meetings, despite being coded in our research as

23. See IOWA CODE § 147.14(d) (2016).
24. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4800 (2016).
25. See MINN. STAT. § 147B.05 (2016).
26. Cf OR. REV. STAT. § 677.235 (2016) (providing that physician assistant member of medical
board may be an unlicensed retiree), amended by S.B. 60, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess., 2017 Or. Laws Ch. 230
(Or. 2017).
27. For example, the Rhode Island Board of Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters has left two of its
six seats vacant since 2008. One of the vacancies stretches back to at least 2004-the earliest meeting
for which minutes are publicly available. See Board ofHearingAid Dealers and Fitters, R.I. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://sos.ri.gov/openmeetings/?pageview entity&id=176 [https://perma.cc/KE7K-T8ML]
(scroll to "Recently Filed Meeting Minutes").
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nondominated.2 8 Similarly, three nonlicensee seats were vacant on the Florida
Council of Licensed Midwifery between 2012 and 2014, allowing for dominated
decision making at most meetings during that interval. 29 The Maine Radiologic
Technology Board of Examiners has had five long-standing vacancies, turning
what appeared by statute to be a nondominated board of four licensees out of
nine members into a dominated board of three licensees out of four members. 30
Several other boards I reviewed featured this vacancy-created professional
dominance that was not apparent from the statute.3
The minutes also revealed that absences of lay board members often led to
professionally dominated decision making, even on a board that appears by
statute to have plenty of nonprofessional involvement. For example, physical
therapists have enjoyed a majority at all of the last five meetings of the North
Dakota Board of Physical Therapy, despite a statutory requirement that half the
board's seats go to nonlicensees.32 Since 2014, licensees have dominated 84

28. These meetings occurred between November 2011 and February 2016, the most recent
meeting for which minutes are available. See State BoardofExaminers ofShorthandReporters, CONN.
DEP'T
OF
CONSUMER
PROTECTION,
http://ct.gov/dcp/cwp/view.asp?a=1624&Q=276082
[https://perma.cc/Q2UV-F4AE] (scroll to "Meeting Minutes").
29. See Meetings, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, http://www.floridahealth.gov/licensing-andregulation/midwifery/meetings/index.html [https://perma.cc/6N8Q-S8MJ] (scroll to "Past Agendas,
Notices, Meeting Minutes and Audio Files" to access previous meeting minutes). The statute provides
for a nondominated board of nine members, including four licensees. See FLA. STAT. § 467.004 (2016).
30. ME. REv. STAT. fit. 32, § 9853 (2016). The minutes from the meetings between October
2014 and March 2015 reflect this reduced membership. See Archived Board Meeting Information, ME.
RADIOLOGIC

TECH.

BD.

OF

ExAM'Rs,

http://www.maine.gov/pfr/professionallicensing/professions/radiological/boardarchives.html
[https://perma.cc/UW7C-2UV6] (last updated March 6, 2017). All of the publicly available minutes
show at least three board vacancies. See id
31. The Wisconsin Radiography Examining Board, which by statute is not dominated, currently
consists of a majority of licensees due to vacancies. See Wisc. STAT. § 15.405(7e) (2016) (establishing
seven-member board with three licensees); Radiography Examining Board-Roster, WIS. DEP'T OF
SAFETY & PROF'L SERVS., http://dsps.wi.gov/Boards-Councils/Agendas/Radiography-ExaminingBoard-Roster [https://perma.cc/J33E-WPH6] (last updated Sept. 2, 2016) (current membership is five
members, including three licensees). The Massachusetts Board of Registration of Physician
Assistants-which by law consists of nine members, including four licensees-is also currently
dominated because of vacancies. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 13, § 11 C (2016); Board Members, MASS.
DEP'T

OF

HEALTH

&

HUMAN

SERVS.,

http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/hcq/dhpl/physicianassistants/about/board-members.html [https://perma.cc/R4P2-BASR]. Licensees similarly dominate the
Illinois Board of Orthotics, Prosthetics, and Pedorthics. See 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 84/25 (2016)
(establishing six-person board with three licensee members); Board of Orthotics, Prosthetics, and
Pedorthics, ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. & PROF'L REGULATION, http://www.idfpr.com/profs/Boards/orthot.asp
[https://perma.cc/B7FR-RLM2] (board currently consists of five members, a majority of whom are
licensees).
32. These meetings took place between November 12, 2015 and June 21, 2016. See Board
Minutes,
N.D.
BD.
OF
PHYSICAL
THERAPY,
https://www.ndbpt.org/minutes.asp
[https://perma.cc/2RAC-NLTD]. Despite the attendance issues, the current composition of the board
would otherwise reflect the statutorily required membership. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-26.1-02 (2015);
North Dakota Board of Physical Therapy Members, N.D. BD. OF PHYSICAL THERAPY,
https://www.ndbpt.org/aboutus.asp [https://perma.cc/2ZKY-743Z].
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percent of the meetings of the Massachusetts Board of Registration of Physician
Assistants, despite the statute calling for only four PAs to serve on a board of
nine.33 Only lay members ever seem to miss meetings of the California Board of
Accountancy; the board is not dominated by statute but had a majority of
34
licensees at all the meetings for which minutes were available online.
Sometimes vacancies and absences combine to extreme effect. Between lay
vacancies and absences, the New Jersey State Board of Court Reporting has
made 100 percent of its decisions since 2014 with a professional majority. In
several cases, there were only two board members present at all, both
professional, making decisions on behalf of what by statute is supposed to be a
six-member, nondominated board.35
Special voting rules can also create professional control where statutory
membership alone does not. It is not uncommon for statutes to relegate
nonprofessional members to nonvoting status. For example, the Arkansas State
Board of Acupuncture prohibits one of its nonlicensee members from voting,
turning what by membership is a nondominated board into one where
acupuncturists enjoy majority voting power. 36 It is especially common to limit
the voting rights of nonmembers with respect to particularly competitive issues
such as admission to the profession and professional discipline. For example, the
lay member of the South Carolina State Board of Dentistry may not vote on any
37
examinations, and the hygienist member cannot vote on dental entrance exams.
Another board takes the turf issue further: the Indiana State Board of Funeral
Cemetery Service prohibits members of the cemetery industry from voting on
funeral director licensing issues, and funeral director licensees from voting on

33. Of these meetings, sixteen of the past seventeen-or 94 percent-have been attended by a
majority group of licensees. See Minutes and Agendas of PreviousBoard Meetings, MASS. DEP'T OF
HEALTH

&

HUMAN

SERVS.,

http://www.mass.gov/eohhs/gov/departments/dph/programs/hcqdhpl/physician[https://perma.cc/MQ46assistants/about/minutes-and-agendas-of-previous-board-meetings.html
JZSN]. Similarly, eleven of the past thirteen meetings (85 percent) of the Florida Council of Licensed
Midwifery have been dominated by licensees, despite the fact that they make up a minority of the board
by statute. See FLA. STAT. § 467.004 (2016); Meetings, FLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH,
http://www.floridahealth.gov/licensing-and-regulation/midwifery/meetings/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S7JC-CFKA].
34. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 5000 (2016); CBA Meeting Materials, CAL. BD. OF
http://www.dca.ca.gov/cba/communications-and-outreach/meeting-materials.shtml
ACCOUNTANCY,
[https://perma.cc/SQ83-A52J].
35. See, e.g., Public Session Minutes, N.J. STATE BD. OF COURT REPORTING (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/cou/Minutes/crmin_11 1714.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGD7-DFHE]
(noting only two licensees, who together constituted a quorum, as the only board members present).
36. See ARK- CODE ANN. § 17-102-201(a)(4)(B) (West 2016) ("However, the ex officio
member shall have no vote, shall not serve as an officer of the board, and shall not be counted to establish
a quorum or a majority necessary to conduct business.").
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-15-20(E) (2016) ("All members of the board have full voting
rights except that the lay member is exempt from voting on examinations for licensure and the dental
hygienists are exempt from voting on examination for licensure for dentists.").
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cemetery issues." Some nondominated boards rely on dominated committees to
make competitively sensitive decisions. 39
Using statutory requirements to measure dominance may also understate
professional control because of ambiguity in the statutory language. Some
statutes are clear that the nonprofessional seats must be held by individuals
without a license, 40 but others establish a floor on the number of licensee
members without setting a ceiling. These boards were not coded as dominated
because the statute did not technically require dominance, but many of these
boards are de facto dominated. For example, the licensing statute for real estate
professionals in Hawaii states that "at least four" board members must be
licensed real estate brokers; in reality, seven of the nine members are licensees.41
The statute establishing the Indiana Board of Respiratory Care Practitioners
requires two licensees, but permits three, to serve on a board of five.42 At present,
three respiratory care practitioners serve. With vacancies in the two remaining
nonprofessional seats, this board is 100 percent dominated in fact, while
according to its statute it is nondominated by law.43
Examples of statutory membership understating professional dominance
are easy to find, but it is difficult to know how far the problem goes-not just
because there are almost 1,800 boards at work in the U.S., each typically meeting
several times a year. The bigger problem is that boards tend to be opaque about
their activities. For example, many boards do not post their minutes online;"

38. See IND. CODE § 25-15-9-11 (2016). The effect of this voting restriction is to turn a
nominally eleven-member, nondominated board into a seven-member, licensee-dominated board
whenever it considers licensing matters. These responsibilities include, inter alia, determining the
qualifications of applicants, establishing standards of practice, and investigating and prosecuting
disciplinary violations. See id. § 25-15-9-9.
39. See
TPBE
Board
Committees,
TEx.
BD.
OF
PROF'L
ENG'RS,
https://engineers.texas.gov/boardcommittees.htm [https://perma.cc/3TXG-VUGM]. While the Texas
Board of Professional Engineers is not dominated by statute, its licensing committee consists of only
licensed professional engineers. Id.
40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.01.025 (2016) (specifying that public members of state
licensing boards may not practice or have a direct financial interest in the occupation the board
regulates).
41. See HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 467-3 (West 2017); Meet the Commissioners, HAW. DEP'T
OF

COMMERCE

&

CONSUMER

AFFAIRS,

REAL

ESTATE

BRANCH,

http://cca.hawaii.gov/reb/homeabout/commbio [https://perma.cc/7T2L-DNJM] (identifying seven
members of nine-person real estate commission as licensed brokers).
42. IND. CODE ANN. § 25-34.5-2-2 (West 2016).
43. See Committee Minutes & Agendas, IND. RESPIRATORY CARE COMM'N,
http://www.in.gov/pla/2627.htm [https://perma.cc/BR35-9F3N].
44. See Upcoming Board Meetings, LA. STATE BD. OF PRACTICAL NURSE EXAM'RS,
http://www.lsbpne.com/board meetings.phtml [https://perma.cc/G24A-A5TQ] (listing agenda for
upcoming board meeting only); Orthotics, Prosthetics & Pedorthics, ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. & PROF'L
REGULATION, http://www.idfpr.com/profs/orthotics.asp [https://perma.cc/8W86-BQ2J] (click "Board
Information" drop-down box, then follow "Meeting Notices & Minutes" hyperlink) (listing no previous
meeting minutes); Board of Licensingfor Perfusionists, ILL. DEP'T OF FIN. & PROF'L REGULATION,
https://www.idfpr.com/profs/Boards/pfusion.asp (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) (listing no minutes);
General

Board

Information,

PENN.

STATE

BD.

OF

LANDSCAPE

ARCHITECTS,
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45
those that do are often incomplete or not up-to-date. My research was further
hindered by many boards' failure to list their current members and professional
statuses.46 Some states provided the option of looking up a licensee by name, but
in many cases I had to resort to an internet search to determine a board member's
professional status.4
Worse still, my research revealed that boards do not always follow the laws
that created them. In my limited inquiry into the minutes of a small fraction of
the licensing boards in the United States, I found three such instances; in all
cases, the violations were in favor of more extreme and entrenched professional
involvement in board activity. 48 If the boards do not follow their own statutes, it

http://www.dos.pa.gov/ProfessionalLicensing/BoardsCommissions/LandscapeArchitects/Pages/Gener
al-Board-Information.aspx [https://perma.cc/4MYC-5FP5] (providing link to third-party vendors from
which to purchase previous meeting minutes); General Board Information, PENN. STATE BD. OF
EXAM'RS,

AUCTIONEER

http://www.dos.pa.gov/ProfessionalLicensing/BoardsCommissions/AuctioneerExaminers/Pages/Gene
ral-Board-Information.aspx [https://perma.cc/RCW8-63WH] (last visited Aug. 15, 2017) (same).
45.

See, e.g., Board Meeting Minutes, ARK. PROF'L BAIL BONDSMAN LICENSING BD.,

http://apbblb.myarkansas.net/public/files/boardminutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/9APL-TAH9] (providing
list of nonfunctional links to board minutes from 2003-2010 only).
46.

See

Contact Us,

ME.

BD.

OF

COMPLEMENTARY

HEALTH

CARE

PROVIDERS,

http://www.maine.gov/pfr/professionallicensing/professions/complementary/contactus.html
[https://perma.cc/QK4Q-ZPTE] (failing to list current members of the board and directing board-related
inquiries to a generic email address); Board Meeting Information, ME. RADIOLOGIC TECH. BD. OF
EXAM'RS,

http://www.maine.gov/pfr/professionallicensing/professions/radiological/board meetings.htlml
[https://perma.cc/M3ZB-NYG6] (same); List of Health Facility Administrator Board Members, IN.
STATE BD. OF HEALTH FACILITY ADMINS., http://www.in.gov/pla/2809.htm [https://penma.cc/K6YN7JCS] (providing list of current board members, but not their professional credentials).
47. For example, the Wyoming Real Estate Commission's public website fails to identify its
members' professional credentials or provide a way to verify their license status, such as through a
database search. See Wyoming Real Estate Commissioners, WYO. REAL ESTATE COMM'N,
https://sites.google.com/a/wyo.gov/rec/real-estate-commission [https://perma.cc/K6MD-Z39M].
48. The entire Rhode Island Board of Hearing Aid Dealers and Fitters-which has had the same
four members since 2006-appears to be in violation of a statutory provision limiting consecutive terms
of service. See 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-49-15 (2016) ("The term of office of each member shall be three
(3) years.... No member of the board who has served two (2) or more full terms may be reappointed to
the board until at least one year after the expiration of his or her most recent full term of office."); R.I.
DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 27. At least two of the entrenched members are current licensees. The
Arizona Acupuncture Board of Examiners appears to be in violation of a statutory provision that
mandates professional diversity in its membership. While two members must be licensed as
chiropractors, physicians and surgeons, osteopaths, naturopaths, or homeopathic physicians, the statute
plainly states these members "shall not be licensed pursuant to the same chapter." ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-3902 (2016). Nonetheless, licensed chiropractors currently occupy both seats. See Boardand
Staff

Members, STATE

OF

ARIZ.

ACUPUNCTURE

BD.

OF

EXAM'RS,

https://acupunctureboard.az.gov/about/board-staff-members [https://perma.cc/LV4X-7FKD] (current
board roster); Meeting Notices and Agendas, and Minutes, STATE OF ARIZ. ACUPUNCTURE BD. OF
EXAM'RS, https://acupunctureboard.az.gov/about/meetings [https://perma.cc/D3HL-W8FL] (meeting
minutes). Finally, and perhaps most egregiously, the Rhode Island Board of Examiners for Nursing
Home Administrators appears to be in violation of a provision intended to prevent the board from
becoming dominated by licensees. According to the statute, three members of the seven-person board
"shall be persons licensed as nursing home administrators"; further, the statute prohibits a majority of
members from "represent[ing] . . . a single profession or category of institution"-licensees
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is impossible to know just how much worse the problem is in fact than it appears
by law.

II.
THE CURRENT LEGAL CRISIS

The degree of professional dominance on state licensing boards is troubling
enough as a matter of policy. But states now find themselves in legal hot water
over their use of these de facto self-regulatory bodies after North Carolina
Dental. The case has prompted suits against licensing boards challenging board
conduct as anticompetitive, and claiming that the defendant board is not entitled
to immunity from federal antitrust liability. This Part summarizes these suits,
describes the current state of antitrust immunity after North CarolinaDental, and
identifies the other legal questions relevant to antitrust liability for occupational
licensing boards. The upshot is that a great many boards cannot claim antitrust
state action immunity; some, undoubtedly, regulate in ways that run afoul of the
antitrust laws. States ought to take these new suits seriously.
A.

PendingSuits Against Licensing Boards in the Wake ofNorth Carolina
Dental

Since the Court's decision in North Carolina Dental, issued in February
2015, over a dozen suits have been filed against state licensing boards alleging
Sherman Act violations and arguing that the board is not subject to state action
immunity. Perhaps unsurprisingly, North Carolina has been the hardest hit, with
three suits against three different boards.49 California is facing two suits, 50 and
56
55
Connecticut,51 Georgia, 52 Louisiana, 53 Nevada, 54 Pennsylvania, Mississippi,

included. See 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-45-1(a) (2016). The board currently consists of only four members,
75 percent of whom are active licensees. See Board of Eraminersfor Nursing Home Administrators,
STATE,
OF
DEP'T
RI.
http://sos.ri.gov/govdirectory/index.php?page=DetailDeptAgency&eid=251 [https://perma.cc/TP24OF
R.I.
DEP'T
Verification,
to
"Membership"); License
(scroll
KSAM]
HEALTH, https://healthri.mylicense.com/verification [https://perma.cc/9ELY-T3E7].
49. See Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-cv-59-D (E.D.N.C. filed Feb. 2, 2016); Henry v.
N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1: 15-cv-831 (M.D.N.C. filed Oct. 7,2015); LegalZoom.com, Inc.
v. N.C. State Bar, No. 1: 15-cv-439 (M.D.N.C. filed June 3, 2015).
50. See Kinney v. State Bar of Cal., No. 3:16-cv-02277 (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 27, 2016);
Gonzalez v. Dept. of Real Estate, No. 2:15-cv-2448 GEB GGH PS (E.D. Cal. filed Nov. 11, 2015).
51. See Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary Med., No. 3:15-cv-00906 (CSH) (D. Conn. filed June
12, 2015).
52. See Colindres v. Battle, No. 1:15-cv-02843-MHS (N.D. Ga. filed Aug. 12, 2015).
53. See Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, No. 3:15-cv-00615-JJB-SCR (M.D. La. filed Aug. 12,
2015).
54. See Strategic Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharm., No. 2:16-cv-00171 (D. Nev.
Jan. 1, 2016).
55. See Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam'rs, No. 2:15-cv-01334-NBF (W.D. Pa. filed
Oct. 14, 2015).
56. See Axcess Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Miss. State Bd. of Med. Licensure, No. 3:15-cv-00307WHB-JCG (S.D. Miss. filed Apr. 24, 2015).
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Tennessee,5 7 and Texas 58 are each facing one suit. As my empirical results show,
these thirteen boards are not unique-for every board that has been sued, there
are more than one hundred others that are potentially vulnerable. Because
altering board composition or establishing supervision requires legislation, in
most cases states have not been able to act quickly enough to insulate themselves
from challenges. 5 9 With the passing of each legislative cycle, the states are
exposing themselves to more of these disruptive and costly lawsuits.
The variety of the suits reflects the spectrum of competitive risks posed by
professional self-regulation. Several boards are accused of suppressing
innovative new forms of professional practice that threaten the bottom line of
traditional practitioners. In Texas, for example, a telemedicine provider has
challenged the Texas Board of Medicine's rule that a "doctor-patient
relationship" cannot be established without an in-person meeting.60 The rule has
made it impossible for Teladoc, Inc. to provide low-cost care to patients living
in remote areas or to patients who, for health reasons, cannot easily travel to a
doctor's office.61 In Nevada, a direct-ship veterinary pharmaceuticals provider is
suing the State Board of Pharmacy for its interpretation of a veterinary board
rule that would put the provider out of business.62
Other suits allege unreasonable and unfair entry barriers. The Tennessee
Council for Hearing Aid Specialists is currently defending accusations that the
board uses an entry exam to prevent entry and competition-an exam written,
administered, and scored by board members themselves. 6 3 According to Beltone,
Inc., the plaintiff hearing aid company, the exam is deliberately designed to
prevent its employees from entering the profession (with a 10 percent pass rate),

57. See WSPTN Corp. v. Tenn. Dep't ofHealth, No. 3:15-cv-00840 (M.D. Tenn. filed July 30,
2015).
58. See Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. filed Apr. 29,2015).
59. Georgia has been able to act quickly, passing legislation in response to North Carolina
Dental. It sought to establish active supervision by giving the Governor the power and duty to review
decisions by the state's occupational licensing boards. See Georgia Professional Regulation Reform Act,
HB 952, 153rd Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Ga. 2016) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3).
60. See Amended Complaint ¶ 112, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00343-RP
(W.D. Tex. July 6, 2015); 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8 (requiring "a face-to-face visit" to establish
doctor-patient relationship before a doctor can issue a prescription and specifying that communications
exchanged via email, text, chat, or phone "are inadequate" to establish such a relationship).
61. See Amended Complaint ¶% 52, 128, 131, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15-cv00343-RP (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2015) ("For patients in underserved or rural areas, being forced to make
an in-person visit to a physician when this is not medically necessary ... creates a real and inappropriate
burden.... [The rule] would end Teladoc's provision of telehealth services in Texas.... Some patients
who would have sought treatment from Teladoc will, in its absence, delay or forgo receiving healthcare
altogether, with potentially devastating consequences.").
62. See Complaint ¶ 4, Strategic Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Pharm., No. 2:16-cv00171 (D. Nev. Jan. 29, 2016) (alleging that the Pharmacy Board has tried to stop plaintiffs "innovative
competitive practices or face having its statutorily required pharmacy license revoked").
63. See Complaint IM35-41, WSPTN Corp. v. Tenn. Dep't ofHealth, No. 3:15-cv-00840 (M.D.
Tenn. filed July 30, 2015) (describing the practicum-created and administered by the board-as
"exceptionally difficult," "arbitrary," and "subjective").
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and admit employees of board members, who enjoy a significantly higher pass
rate." Restricted professional entry is likewise an issue in a currently pending
suit against the Louisiana Board of Nursing; the suit alleges that the board
decertified a nursing school in order to stifle competition. 6 5
Another set of suits concerns occupational scope-of-practice, the issue in
North CarolinaDental. The practice of "dry needling" has ignited a professional
turf war in North Carolina, where physical therapists have filed suit against the
Acupuncture Board for its attempts to prevent physical therapists from using dry
(solid, noninjectable) needles in the treatment of joint and muscle pain.66 The
Acupuncture Board issued cease-and-desist letters to the offending physical
therapists, asserting that dry needling is the practice of acupuncture and outside
the scope of physical therapy practice.6 7 The physical therapists' suit prompted
the Acupuncture Board, in turn, to sue the Physical Therapy Board for a
declaratory judgment that dry needling was outside the scope of physical-therapy
practice. That suit was unsuccessful, 68 and the therapists' antitrust suit against
the Acupuncture Board is still pending. Scope of practice is also the central issue
in an antitrust suit against the Pennsylvania State Board of Auctioneer
Examiners. An individual who auctioned toy trains online has filed suit
challenging the board's decision to cite and fine him for the unlicensed practice
of auctioneering. 69

64. Id. The suit also alleges harassment from employees of board members, one of whom
allegedly donned a wig and harassed customers at the plaintiffs business. See id. ¶ 62 ("Looney [an
employee] provided false names and contact information regarding her identity ... using the alias
'Karen Hoover' when appearing at the Johnson City location while wearing a long auburn/brown wig,
and using the name 'Penny Trexler' when appearing at the Bristol office while wearing a different
hairstyle.").
65. See Complaint 'I 9-17, Rodgers v. La. Bd. ofNursing, No. 3:15-cv-00615-JJB-SCR (M.D.
La. filed Aug. 12, 2015) (arguing that the board's use of a pass-rate cutoff to decertify nursing schools
is an unreasonable restraint of trade).
66. See Amended Complaint TT 30-34, Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15cv-00831 (M.D.N.C. filed Feb. 3, 2016) ("During dry needling, physical therapists insert needles into
trigger points (taut bands in the muscles) to relieve patients' pain or dysfunction... .Research has shown
that dry needling improves pain control, reduces muscle tension, normalizes dysfunction, and
accelerates rehabilitation.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
67. See id. T 106 ("[The letters] ordered the targets to immediately 'CEASE AND DESIST'
providing dry needling services ... [and] stated that practicing acupuncture without a license was a Class
1 misdemeanor.").
68. David Quick, Dry Needling Moves into Physical Therapy Mainstream, POST & COURIER
(June 26, 2016, 9:00 AM), http://www.postandcourier.com/20160627/160629615/as-dry-needlingmoves-into-physical-therapy-mainstream-ama-calls-for-a-standard-of-practice [https://perma.cc/6U52RK5C] ("In April, a North Carolina Superior Court judge dismissed a lawsuit filed by the N.C.
Acupuncture Licensing Board seeking a declaration that dry needling by physical therapists is the
unlawful practice of acupuncture and to require the N.C. Board of Physical Therapy Examiners to advise
its licensees that dry needling is outside the scope of physical therapist practice.") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
69. See Complaint T$ 37-39, Bauer v. Pa. State Bd. of Auctioneer Exam'rs, No. 2:15-cv-01334NBF (W.D. Pa. filed Oct. 14, 2015) (describing how the board served a citation on Bauer and his
business for the unlicensed practice of auctioneering and fined him $1,500).
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These suits not only expose states to significant financial liability, but they
threaten to unravel the way that the occupations have been regulated for decades.
A finding of no antitrust immunity means that the board members are legally no
different from members of a private cartel, and so are personally financially
liable for three times the compensatory damages suffered by a plaintiff.70 As
amici in North Carolina Dental argued, this kind of liability is likely to chill
board service unless states take steps to indemnify or immunize board
members.7 1 And the problem goes beyond money damages; most of these suits
ask for injunctive relief that would reverse the challenged regulatory action.72
Without state action immunity, any board regulation that does not comply with
federal antitrust law is just a lawsuit away from invalidity. In short, these suits
represent an existential crisis for the way almost a third of American workers are
regulated.
B.

A New Antitrust Federalism

The success of these suits will turn on whether the boards are able to claim
immunity from federal antitrust law. That inquiry will be guided by a line of
Supreme Court precedent, starting with Parker v. Brown73 from 1943 and
running through North CarolinaDental from 2015. These cases create a doctrine
known as "antitrust federalism," so named for the boundary immunity creates
between state regulation and federal antitrust liability. The doctrine has many
twists and turns, but the upshot is that state action is immune from antitrust law;
after North CarolinaDental, only conduct for which the state has made itself
accountable will be considered "state action" for immunity purposes. 74

70. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations
FaceAntitrustScrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1152 (2014) (observing that without immunity, "the
industry members on the board would be liable for treble damages to competitors and consumers harmed
by their agreement").
71. See Brief for West Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, N.C. State
Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534) (noting that without immunity,
"qualified professionals may simply refuse to serve").
72. See, e.g., Complaint at 21, Strategic Pharm. Sols., Inc. v. Nev. State Bd. of Phann., No. 2:16cv-00171 (D. Nev. filed Jan. 29, 2016) (seeking permanent injunction); Amended Complaint ¶¶ 17879, Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15-cv-00831-WO-LPA (M.D.N.C. filed Feb. 3,
2016) (requesting injunctive relief); Amended Complaint 117, Teladoc, Inc. v. Tex. Med. Bd., No. 1:15cv-00343-RP (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2015) (seeking preliminary and permanent injunctive relief).
73. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
74. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, The New Antitrust Federalism, 102 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1408
(2016) ("acts of the state, for immunity purposes, are defined as a matter of federal antitrust law to
include only those acts for which the state takes full and transparent political accountability"). See Sina
Safvati, Public-PrivateDivide in Parker State-Action Immunity, 63 UCLA L. REv. 1110, 1110 (2016)
(arguing that "the U.S. Supreme Court should formally adopt a rule of decision inspired by the principles
of financial disinterest and political accountability to govem Parkerimmunity doctrine").
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Parker Immunity and Midcal's Two-Step

In 1943, the Supreme Court decided Parkerv. Brown, creating what has
come to be known as "Parkerimmunity"75 or "state action immunity."76 The
essential holding of Parkerwas that the Sherman Act was intended to reach only
private price fixing and other anticompetitive conduct, not state activity such as
regulation.77 But Parker also held that a state cannot merely sanction private
antitrust violations, explaining that "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that
Several decades later, in California Retail Liquor
their action is lawful."
DealersAss'n v. MidcalAluminum, Inc., the Court explained the meaning of this
somewhat cryptic language when it observed that "the national policy in favor
a gauzy cloak of state
of competition cannot be thwarted by casting ...
involvement over what is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement." 79
If a state's blessing-the "gauzy cloak"-is not enough, what must a state
do to claim regulation as its own? Midcal provided an answer: a state must either
regulate directly through its sovereign branches or clearly delegate specific
regulatory tasks to private actors and then actively supervise their rules and
decisions. Thus Midcal created a two-pronged test for immunity for regulation
created outside of the state's sovereign branches: private regulators receive
immunity if they act according to a state's "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed" policy to displace competition, and if they are "actively supervised"
by the state.80
2.

Hallie, North Carolina Dental, and the Public/PrivateDivide

Shortly after Midcal, the Court further complicated the private/public
distinction at the heart of Parkerimmunity when it decided that some substate
entities-such as municipalities-were entitled to a shortcut to immunity. The
Court held in Town of Hallie v. Eau Claire that cities enjoy immunity for their
anticompetitive regulation as long as they meet Midcal's first prong; even
unsupervised municipal regulation is immune so long as it comports with the
state's "clearly articulated" intent to displace competition.81 The court justified
the shortcut by appealing to a city's public nature, explaining that "[w]here the

75. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein & Terry Calvani, State Action as a Shield and a Sword in a
MedicalServices Antitrust Context: Parker v. Brown in ConstitutionalPerspective, 1978 DUKE L.J. 389,
404 (1978) (using the term "Parkerimmunity").
76. See, e.g., Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for "State Action "After Lafayette, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 435, 435 (1981) (using the term "state action immunity").
77. Parker,317 U.S. at 351 (noting that the Sherman Act does not mention the states at all).
78. Id.
79. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 98 (1980).
80. Id. at 97.
81. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 (1985) ("We now conclude that the
active state supervision requirement should not be imposed in cases in which the actor is a
municipality.").
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actor is a municipality, there is little or no danger that it is involved in a private
price-fixing arrangement." 82
Thus the Court's state action immunity jurisprudence, from Parker to
Hallie, has conditioned immunity on whether a regulator is private or public.
Parker said that private cartels do not enjoy immunity. Midcal said that
combinations of private actors need state articulation and supervision to be
immune. And Hallie said that cities-not quite "the state" for immunity
purposes, but public in nature-are immune without supervision. What was
unclear until North CarolinaDental is what made a substate regulatory entity
sufficiently public to enjoy the Hallie shortcut. The answer was essential to
determining the status of occupational licensing boards. Boards typically meet
the "clear articulation" prong easily; courts have held that the ubiquitous
statutory language giving licensing boards the authority to create professional
entry and practice requirements suffices.83 But it would seem that the vast
majority, including the board in North Carolina Dental, are not actively
supervised by the state. 84 If occupational licensing boards are not entitled to
Hallie's shortcut, they are not immune.
Who, besides municipalities, can take the Hallie shortcut? Crucial to
answering this question was understanding what made cities "public" and so
entitled to immunity even without supervision. One possible interpretation,
hinted at by a footnote in Hallie suggesting (without deciding) that state agencies
are also entitled to the shortcut,85 is that cities are governmental and so "public."
The board in North CarolinaDental seized on this possibility and argued that
because the board was created by state statute, deemed a "state agency" by the
state itself, and required an oath of office from its members, it was governmental,
public, and entitled to immunity without supervision.86
The North CarolinaDental Court quite appropriately rejected this formalist
reading of Hallie, making clear that what made the municipality in that case
unlikely to join a private price-fixing cartel was not its claim to being
governmental in a formal sense, but rather the relative lack of incentives to selfdeal among its members. 87 Whether or not local officials can always be counted
on to govern in the public interest, their status as elected, accountable officials

82. Id. at 47 (emphasis omitted).
83. See, e.g., Benson v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 673 F.2d 272,275-76 (9th Cir. 1982)
(holding that a statute which established the board of dentistry and gave it power to regulate professional
practice and entry requirements satisfied the clear articulation prong).
84. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
85. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46 n.10 ("In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely that
active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that issue.").
86. See Brief for Petitioner at 38-39, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101
(2015) (No. 13-534).
87. NC. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1111. For this formulation of the
public/private divide at the heart ofParkerimmunity, the Court was indebted to Einer Richard Elhauge,
The Scope ofAntitrust Process, 104 HARv. L. REv. 667, 697-729 (1991) (arguing that where regulators
have a personal financial self-interest in the regulation, state action immunity is inappropriate).
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without a direct financial stake in regulation makes them "public" for immunity
purposes. In contrast, an entity controlled by "active market participants" in the
very market the entity regulates poses a significant risk of cartelization, such that
state supervision or antitrust liability is required.
3.

The New Antitrust Federalismand State Accountability

North CarolinaDental stands for a new antitrust federalism, where states
must take extra steps to insulate the most competitively risky form of
regulation-self-regulation-from antitrust liability. The new paradigm turns
not on whether the entity claiming immunity has some formal relationship with
the state, but rather on whether that entity has an inherent incentive to self-deal
and, if so, whether the state has taken transparent accountability for the
regulation it authorizes. 8 Understanding the new antitrust federalism and its
emphasis on state accountability is crucial to answering some questions the
North CarolinaDental case left open. As I will discuss in Part III, it is key to
understanding what the court meant by "controlling number" and "active market
participant." But before getting to these interpretive questions, a word or two
about antitrust liability for boards will show that board composition is a
determinative factor in the current legal crisis.
C.

The Reality ofAntitrust Exposure

The fact of dominance-or having "a controlling number of. . . active
market participants," in the words of the Court-does not itself mean a board
faces antitrust liability. Even dominated boards may still enjoy immunity if they
are actively supervised by the state. And immunity is just one part of the
question. Antitrust liability also turns on whether the board's conduct violates
the Sherman Act in the first place. A full picture of board exposure, after North
Carolina Dental, thus requires knowing whether states supervise their boards
and whether board conduct is likely to violate the Sherman Act. The bottom line
is that because states probably do not supervise their boards, and because a
significant amount of board activity potentially runs afoul of the Sherman Act,
these suits pose a real threat to the states and their licensing boards.
1.

Do States Supervise?

Actively supervised licensing boards will not face antitrust liability.
Unfortunately, the Court has not been clear about what constitutes adequate state
supervision.8 ' Although the Court has decided eleven antitrust immunity cases
since Midcal created the active supervision requirement, the Court has had few
88. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) ("Federalism serves to assign
political responsibility, not to obscure it").
89. See, e.g., Joshua Rosenstein, Active Supervision of Health Care Cooperative Ventures
Seeking State Action Antitrust Immunity, 18 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 329, 334 (1995) (observing that
"[d]efining the 'active supervision' requirement ... has proven to be problematic").
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occasions to define that term. The issue was conceded in several cases, including
North CarolinaDental;90 in others, the Court decided the case on the "clear
articulation" prong alone. 91 In two cases, the Court directly confronted the
supervision question and found state supervision lacking. 92 Thus, the Court has
never explicitly approved of a supervisory regime. It has, however, provided
some guidance about supervision, most notably in North Carolina Dental.
Active supervision by the state itself must be more than a "negative option," or
an unexercised power to review. 93 It must be substantive; state review of its
delegated regulation must consider more than procedural questions and must
reach the question of whether the regulation substantively comports with state
policy. 94 And the state "supervisor must have the power to veto or modify" the

decision it reviews.95 But the Court also emphasized that "the inquiry regarding
active supervision is flexible and context-dependent," 96 making it difficult to
predict whether a state's system of review will pass muster.
A full examination of the various mechanisms of state supervision of
occupational boards is outside the scope of this Article, but there is reason to
believe that most states do not actively supervise all their licensing boards. Most
states do allow for review of board decisions for their conformity with a state's
Administrative Procedure Act, but this review is likely to be considered
insufficiently substantive to qualify as supervision. 97 Some states create
mechanisms whereby a rule can be challenged-either in court or by another
state entity-but these are likely the "negative option" found lacking by the
Court. 98 Some states have "rules review" procedures whereby a state commission
or committee reviews substate regulations, such as those created by a licensing

90. See NC. State Bd ofDentalExam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116; S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference,
Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 79 (1985).
91. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S. Ct. 1003, 1011 (2013); Town of Hallie v.
City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985); Cmty. Commc'ns Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 5456 (1982).
92. See Ticor, 504 U.S. at 638 (holding that the "mere potential for state supervision is not an
adequate substitute" for active supervision); Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988) (concluding that
"we need not consider the 'clear articulation' prong ... because the 'active supervision' requirement is
not satisfied").
93. See NC. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1112-13 (explaining that the power to
review must be actually exercised to be "active supervision"); see also Ticor, 504 U.S. at 622-23
(holding that the mere potential for review is inadequate).
94. See N.C State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116 ("The supervisor must review the
substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the procedures followed to produce it. . . ."); see
also Patrick, 486 U.S. at 101 ("[S]tate officials have and exercise power to review particular
anticompetitive acts of private parties and disapprove those that fail to accord with state policy.").
95. NC State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1116.
96. See id. at 1117 ("In general ... the adequacy of supervision otherwise will depend on all the
circumstances of a case.").
97. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 70, at 1123 n.179.
98. See id. at 1123 (noting that "[e]ven schemes where the state provides the final authorization
of a restriction can lack supervision if the state uses a 'negative option' that allows a state's silence to
signify approval").
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board, before they have the force of law. 99 When these committees are
legislative, INS v. Chadha1oo-which has been applied in the state context in all
but one case 0 1-limits the ability of the committee to "modify or veto" as
supervision requires. 1 02 At the time North CarolinaDentalwas decided, no court
or commentator had identified an example of state-level substantive review of
all board activity, located in an executive agency not dominated by active market
03
participants.1
2.

Do LicensingRules Violate the Sherman Act?

Liability also turns on whether a board's conduct constitutes a violation of
Sherman Act standards. In the proceedings below, the FTC found the board's
campaign against nondentist teeth whiteners in North CarolinaDental to be an
anticompetitive restraint of trade because it eliminated a low-price alternative to
teeth whitening in a dental office, with little evidence that practice by nondentists
was harmful to consumers. 104 As in the North CarolinaDental case, boards often
impose restraints that would run afoul of the antitrust laws if created by private
cartels. 05 For example, the Court has found it appropriate to impose liability on
private organizations promulgating rules of ethics-analogous to the one
challenged in the currently pending Teladoc case-that have significant
anticompetitive effects.1 06 Courts have also found private associations liable for
creating unfair and burdensome entry requirements similar to the ones allegedly

99. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1052 (2013) (establishing an executive branch
Regulatory Review Council to review and approve rules proposed by state agencies before they go into
effect); Legislative Regulation Review Committee, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.cga.ct.gov/rr
[https://perma.cc/SC7G-GKQ6] (explaining that "[i]t is the responsibility of the Legislative Regulation
Review Committee to review regulations proposed by state agencies and approve them before
regulations are implemented"); Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1201-02 (1999)
(observing that in many states "a rules review committee within the legislature has the power to veto,
suspend, or delay rules or the power to allow proposed rules to lapse absent approval, making legislative
committee approval of rules a mandatory requirement in the rulemaking process.").
100. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
101. See Rossi, supra note 99, at 1202-03.
102. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 956-59 (1983).
103. The new regime created by Georgia in response to North CarolinaDental, whereby the
Governor has the power and duty to review all proposed occupational licensing rules, is arguably an
example of active supervision. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3 (West 2016) (giving the governor
authority to "review and, in writing, approve or veto any rule" proposed by a state professional licensing
board before it becomes effective). Whether this solution will be viewed by the courts as "active
supervision" depends on how its vague legislative mandate is ultimately interpreted and implemented.
104. See In the Matter of the N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 152 F.T.C. 640, 667 (2011) (finding
that the board's public safety arguments were unpersuasive).
105. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 70, at 1132-34 (describing the ways in which occupational
licensing can violate Sherman Act principles).
106. See Nat'l Soc'y ofProf 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-94 (1978) (rejecting a
professional association's argument that its ethical rule "inures to the public benefit").
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imposed by the Tennessee Council for Hearing Aid Specialists. 107 Similarly, by
not recognizing out-of-state licenses, boards effect horizontal market allocation,
which in other contexts is per se illegal.10 8 In short, many board activities
potentially implicate the Sherman Act.
There is some ambiguity, however, about whether boards will or should be
subject to the same standards as purely private associations. The economic
justification for professional licensing-based on the ostensibly procompetitive
effects of limited entry and practice rules-is that it corrects market failures that
lead to increased public health and safety.109 The Court has said, outside of the
licensing-board context, that such arguments are a "frontal assault" on Sherman
Act policy.1 10 For example, in NationalSociety of ProfessionalEngineers, the
Court considered a professional society's ethical rule forbidding member
engineers from mentioning price at the bid stage. As a procompetitive
justification, the society raised the argument that price-based selection of
engineering services led to low-cost, low-quality engineering that endangered
the public.1 1 ' The Court purported not to even consider this effect as possibly
outweighing the obvious effect of the bidding ban on price levels. The Court
quipped that, in a Sherman Act case, a defendant may not argue that "competition
12
is [not] in the public interest."
The Court's righteous indignation in Professional Engineers can be
forgiven-the price bidding restriction was extremely anticompetitive-but the
case cannot mean what it says. The rule of reason, which the Court has called
"the prevailing standard of analysis" in § 1 cases under the Sherman Act,1 13
condemns only those restrictions for which the anticompetitive effects outweigh
the procompetitive effects. As the Court has said, "the test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy

107. For example, the Court found Sherman Act liability appropriate when a gas burner
manufacturer was denied approval by a private standard-setting association that used a test influenced
by his competitors and "not based on 'objective standards."' See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658 (1961). Similarly, the Court found a Sherman Act violation when
a multiple-listing service comprised of competing real estate agents tried to impose a "favorable business
reputation requirement" on its members that was vague, subjective, and administered by the competitors
themselves. See United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1376, 1382, 1385-86 (5th Cir.
1980).
108. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 70, at 1133 (observing that "nonrecognition of out-of-state
licenses subdivides the national market for services and insulates professionals in one state from
competitors in another" and that such market allocation is per se illegal "when agreed to by private
competitors").
109. See id. at 1111-18 (describing the economics of occupational licensing).
110. ProflEng'rs,435 U.S. at 695.
111. Id. at 684.
112. Id. at 692.
113. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49 (1977).
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competition."114 This holding, and the rule of reason itself, implies that
sometimes restricting rivalry can promote competition in a different sense. In
these cases, it is perfectly acceptable to argue that competition (if taken to mean
atomistic, all-against-all rivalry) is not "in the public interest."
Perhaps Professional Engineers meant something narrower-that public
health and safety, rather than consumer welfare measured in price, output or
quality, cannot form the basis of a procompetitive argument in a Sherman Act
case. This reading would also spell trouble for licensing boards; virtually all
justifications for their conduct reduce to promoting health and safety. But there
is reason to doubt even this narrower meaning of ProfessionalEngineers. In the
case itself, the Court did not use a per se standard to condemn the rule against
price bidding, despite the fact that similar prohibitions achieved outside of the
professional context would undoubtedly be summarily condemned. More
recently, in California Dental Association v. FTC, the Court accepted what
amounted to health and safety arguments justifying an advertising restriction
promulgated by a private association of dentists.1 15 The Court credited the dental
association's argument that the restriction could increase service quality, casting
serious doubt on the proposition in Professional Engineers that offering
professional service quality as a procompetitive justification in an antitrust case
is a "frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." 116
Therefore, as a matter of doctrine, it seems unlikely that courts will reject
every board rule that restricts output or raises price in the name of safer, higherquality service. After all, these arguments are economic arguments about market
failure and consumer welfare, categorically similar to those offered in a typical
rule of reason case. Further, as a matter of legal realism, courts will be reluctant
to condemn board conduct per se because to do so would be to invalidate
essentially all nonimmune board regulation, which as my study reveals, is
essentially all board regulation. The courts have the doctrinal room, and probably
the pragmatic sensibility, to use the rule of reason to sort the pro- from the
anticompetitive licensing restrictions. But many restrictions will run afoul of the
Sherman Act, as the North Carolina Dental Board's cease-and-desist campaign
did, 117 potentially exposing boards to significant liability if they cannot claim
state action immunity.
114. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n ofDentists, 476 U.S. 447,458 (1986) (quoting Chi. Bd. ofTrade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
115. Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 774-75 (1999). The association's argument
amounted to a claim that without the restriction, the market for dental services would suffer from
information asymmetries capable of degrading the quality of dental services provided. Id. at 771-73.
The case relies on Akerloff s "lemons" model. For a discussion ofAkerloff s lemons model, CalDental,
and what it means for Professional Engineer's "frontal assault" language, see Rebecca Haw
Allensworth, The CommensurabilityMyth in Antitrust, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1, 33-38 (2016).
116. ProflEng'rs,435 U.S. at695.
117. In the proceedings below, the FTC used the rule of reason to evaluate the Dental Board's
activity. See In the Matter of the N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 152 F.T.C. 640, 669-73 (2011) (applying
rule of reason).
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Are BoardMembers PersonallyLiable?

Suits brought by a government agency, such as the FTC, will probably not
18
impose money damages on board members.' But private suits under § 1 of the
Sherman Act could hold individual members of the board financially liable for
three times the damages claimed by plaintiffs.1" 9 This fact was highlighted by
amici in North CarolinaDental as having the probable effect of chilling board
service,1 20 which seems likely but is also easily addressed by statutory means.
States could statutorily immunize board members as is the common practice for
police officers who face potential § 1983 liability.121 Indemnification, however,
merely shifts the financial liability from the board members to the state; it cannot
eliminate the possibility of widespread financial liability for anticompetitive
occupational restrictions.

III.
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE COURTS: DEFINING "CONTROLLING NUMBER OF ...
ACTIVE MARKET PARTICIPANTS"

As we have seen, North Carolina Dental has made the vast majority of
licensing boards vulnerable to antitrust suit, even under a narrow definition of
"controlling number of . .. active market participants." But this narrow
definition is not inevitable. The current legal crisis may prompt states to
reconsider their board composition to avoid antitrust liability; doing so requires
predicting how the courts will interpret North CarolinaDental's language. Will
courts interpret "controlling number of . .. active market participants" narrowly,
as I did in coding board dominance, by looking only to whether the state statute
requires that a majority of board members hold licenses issued by the board
itself? Or will courts embrace a more capacious definition that could find
"control" with less than a majority?1 22 Will the courts define "market participant"

&

118. See Complaint at 5-6, In the Matter of the N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 152 F.T.C. 640
(2011) (omitting damages in its "notice of contemplated relief').
119. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) (declining to extend state action
immunity to state bar association and remanding the case to allow plaintiffs, a class of consumers of
legal services, to hold individual members of the bar liable for treble damages); John E. Lopatka
William H. Page, State Action and the MeaningofAgreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to
Hybrid Restraints,20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 292 (2003) (noting that "any hybrid restraint that violates
the antitrust laws and fails the tests for immunity leaves private parties exposed to the whole panoply of
antitrust remedies," including treble damages).
120. See Brief for West Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 11, N.C. State
Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534) (noting that without immunity, "qualified
professionals may simply refuse to serve").
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); see, e.g., Jonathan Day & Jeffrey W. Jacobs, Opening the Deep
Pocket-SovereignImmunity Under Section 1983, 31 BAYLOR L. REV. 389, 408 (1979) (observing that
"voluntary assumption of employees' liability by governmental entities ... ha[s] already been adopted
in most jurisdictions, at least to the extent of assuming the burden of defending civil rights claims.").
122. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC STAFF GUIDANCE ON ACTIVE
SUPERVISION OF STATE REGULATORY BOARDS CONTROLLED BY MARKET PARTICIPANTS 8-9 (2015)
[hereinafter FTC STAFF GUIDANCE], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policy-
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as something other than a license holder? 23 And will every board decision need
to be examined on a case-by-case basis, or can states ensure immunity ex ante
through board composition? 24 This Section attempts to answer these questions
by resorting to principles from antitrust state action doctrine, substantive antitrust
law, and, where antitrust runs out of road, from other areas of law addressing
similar questions.
A.

"Active Market Participants"are Those Who Stand to Benefit from
Relaxed Competition

The courts will interpret "active market participant" to mean those most
likely to self-deal, which in the licensing-board context means members
currently holding a license issued by the board itself. This interpretation
comports with the antitrust state action principle that additional state
involvement is necessary when the state relies on industry self-regulation, the
most competitively risky form of governance.1 25 This principle runs from Parker
v. Brown, which warned that a state may not merely authorize antitrust
violations,1 26 through Midcal and Hallie, which together created a shortcut for
immunity for entities particularly unlikely to self-deal.1 27 And it is epitomized
by the holding in North CarolinaDentalthat the six dentist members of the board
posed such risk of self-dealing as to require state supervision.
This interpretation-that an "active market participant" is someone
especially likely to self-deal-also comports with substantive antitrust law.
Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, naked agreements among competitors to restrict
competition are per se illegal.1 28 This rule reflects the notion that competitors,
when combining to decide the terms of their competition, inevitably benefit
themselves at the expense of the consumer.' 29 The principal concern in an

guidance/active supervision of state-boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJ2F-5FL4] (defining "control" to
include some situations where licensees do not constitute a numerical majority).
123. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1123 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (raising the interpretive questions prompted by "active market participants").
124. See id. (discussing the possibility that "active market participant" will be defined according
to the "particular regulation being challenged").
125. See Allensworth, supranote 74, at 1414 (describing the new antitrust federalism as imposing
"additional procedures on states when they use the most competitively risky means of regulation:
regulation by industry itself').
126. 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943) (explaining that "a state does not give immunity to those who
violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful").
127. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 70, at 1123-24 (describing the Midcal test and the "fast track"
created by Hallie).
128. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) ("It has long been
settled that an agreement to fix prices is unlawful per se. It is no excuse that the prices fixed are
themselves reasonable.").
129. See 1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ch. X, pt. I (George Bell & Sons 1908)
(1776) (observing that "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices").
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antitrust suit against a board is that competitors will face mixed motives in
regulating their profession. Board members who are currently in competition
with one another will often find that their interest in protecting consumers
30
conflicts with their profit motives to keep competitors out and prices high.'
1.

Who Are the "Active Market Participants"on a LicensingBoard?

This focus on self-dealing suggests that "active market participants" does
not mean members who participate in the market as consumers. In other legal
contexts, the Court has used the phrase "market participant" to refer to
purchasers,1 3' but in this context the interests of purchasers-in low prices and
high-quality service-would mitigate rather than augment the self-dealing risks
to competition posed by providers. Further, counting consumers toward board
dominance would result in an absurdity, because nearly everyone consumes
professional services such as medicine and dentistry-including nonprofessional
board members. Counting consumers as "active market participants" would
mean 100 percent dominance for boards covering especially popular
professional services and would mean that states could not use board
membership as a route to immunity.
Although it seems clear that "active market participants" means those with
a financial interest in diminishing rivalry and does not mean consumers, there is
still substantial ambiguity about how closely board members must compete to
trigger North CarolinaDental's holding.' 32 We know from the case itself that a
dental board comprised of six dentists, one hygienist, and one consumer member
is dominated and needs supervision. 133 But what about a "mixed" board where
hygienists and dentists together make up a majority, but neither group alone
does? And does that question turn on whether the challenged action pertains to
dentistry, hygiene, or both? The question is crucial because, as my research
reveals, many boards regulate several different professions and require a
professional mix of board members.' 34 The use of the singular in North Carolina
130. See Elhauge, supra note 87, at 702 ("An extensive body of literature establishes that, if freely
permitted to restrain trade, those financially interested in the sale or purchase of goods or services have
incentives to stifle competition, reduce output, and raise prices.").
In constitutional law, for example, a state can privilege its own citizens over out-of-state
131.
interests when it acts as a "market participant" without offending dormant commerce clause principles.
This "market participant" exception applies when the state is acting as a purchaser. See Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976) (finding no constitutional violation where Maryland
purchased automobile hulks from its own citizens on terms more favorable than it imposed on out-ofstate scrap dealers).
132. See Comment, The Supreme Court 2014 Term: Leading Cases, 129 HARV. L. REV. 181,
371, 375-80 (2016) (identifying the ambiguity of the "market" in which "active market participants"
operate, and advocating against a narrow view).
133. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2015) (describing the
Dental Board membership).
134. See, e.g., Delaware Board of Plumbing, Heating, Ventilating, A.C., & Refrigeration
Examiners, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1803 (2016) (stipulating that of nine board members, three must
be licensed plumbers and three must be licensed HVAC professionals); Maine Board of Speech,
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Dental-'"the occupation the board regulates"l 35 -suggests that the Court did
not contemplate this board structure.
When one confronts the reality of mixed board membership, another
meaning, one supported by antitrust economic theory, emerges: supervision is
required when licensees of any occupation within that board's jurisdiction
control a decision. For many mixed boards, overlapping jurisdiction between
occupations means that even different license holders have incentives to relax
competition. And even for mixed boards, where the different licensees do not
provide substitute services, game theory suggests that board members will act
like oligopolists and cooperate to maximize rents for professionals at the expense
of consumers.
First, consider the example of a board comprised of subspecialties that
provide overlapping services: for example, the Georgia Composite Board of
Professional Counselors, Social Workers, and Marriage and Family
Therapists.' 36 There are different educational, experiential, and examination
requirements for each license, and there is reason to think that demand for
counseling is not perfectly elastic between these three subspecialties-that is,
not every consumer is indifferent to receiving counseling from a marriage
therapist, a social worker, or a counselor. At the same time, because the statute
allows all three to conduct "counseling," 37 some consumers probably do
substitute between the specialties, which means that the different licensees
compete to some extent. A licensing restriction relaxing competition among
marriage and family counselors, say, by raising an entry barrier, is likely to also
benefit professional counselors and social workers by making a substitutemarriage and family counseling-less available. All three specialties therefore
have an aligned interest in suppressing competition. So, for the Georgia board,
the three license holders in each specialty (but not the one public member) ought
to count toward the "controlling number" that triggers the supervision
requirement.
Second, consider a board comprised of licensees that provide services that
are not substitutes. Take, for example, the Colorado State Board of Licensure for
Architects, Professional Engineers, and Professional Land Surveyors. The
statute describes each licensed profession as performing distinct services.'3 It
Audiology and Hearing, ME. REv. STAT. tit. 32, § 17201 (2016) (stipulating that of seven board
members, two must be Speech-language pathologists, two audiologists, and two hearing aid dealers and
fitters).
135. N.C State Bd. ofDental Exam rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1106 (emphasis added).
136. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-I0A-4 (West 2016).
137. Marriage and Family specialists may provide individual therapy, and Social Work is defined
as a profession that helps "marriages, families, [and] couples" in addition to individuals. See id. § 4310A-3.
138. Architecture is the "design, construction, enlargement, or alteration of a building or group
of buildings." COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-25-302(6)(a) (West 2016). The practice of engineering is
"the application of special knowledge of the mathematical and engineering sciences to ... the utilization
of the forces, energies, and materials of nature in the development, production, and functioning of
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would appear that these specialties are complements, not substitutes; they are
used in conjunction when constructing a building. Under a simplistic incentive
analysis, providers of complementary services would not support their
counterpart's self-dealing.1 39 Imagine a building project with a total budget for
architecture, engineering, and land surveying. If the architects succeed in raising
price, then the consumer has less in her budget for the other services. This
simplistic analysis would suggest that the engineers and surveyors on the board
have an incentive to veto anticompetitive regulation proposed by the architects,
and vice versa.
Yet there is good reason to count the board's architects, surveyors, and
engineers toward professional "control," in part because economists now
recognize that incentives are more complex when competitors engage in
interdependent behavior.1" A game theoretical analysis of this board suggests
that the members will recognize that all three professions have even more to gain
by approving each other's anticompetitive restrictions than by acting selfishly in
any one instance. The "game" of repeated votes on anticompetitive restrictions
directly benefiting just one specialty resembles the game of oligopoly. In both
cases, the optimal outcome-the one that maximizes the joint returns to the
group-occurs when everyone cooperates. Yet in any individual interaction, one
member can maximize his returns by "cheating" and acting selfishly. 14 1Antitrust
recognizes that competitors can overcome the risk of cheating most easily
through an exchange of promises to cooperate. But even where such direct
communication is impossible, interdependent competitors can achieve the
cooperative (anticompetitive) equilibrium in repeated games. A mixed board has
all the hallmarks of a successful oligopoly. It interacts repeatedly, and provides
a perfect opportunity for direct communication.
There is yet another reason for counting all of a board's licensees, even
from nonoverlapping specialties, as "market participants." The lack of overlap
itself may be a product of cooperation, rather than an inevitable feature of
professional specialization. It is well documented by labor economists that
licensed professionals have a self-interest in defining the scope of their

engineering processes, apparatus, machines, equipment, facilities, structures, buildings, works, or
utilities." Id. § 12-25-102(10)(a). Land surveying "means the application of special knowledge of
principles of mathematics, methods of measurement, and law for the determination and preservation of
land boundaries." Id. § 12-25-202(6)(a).
139. A good is complementary to another good if a price increase in one results in a decrease in
demand of the other. For example, if the price of canoes skyrockets, demand for paddles will decrease
because fewer people will purchase boats. A provider of paddles, therefore, would oppose a price
increase in canoes, and vice versa.
140. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, 59-60 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the use of
game theory and the role of interdependent behavior in antitrust analysis).
141.

See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION

AND ITS PRACTICE § 4.1a, at 149-55 (2005) (discussing the role of cheating in cartel behavior and
antitrust analysis of cartels); POSNER, supranote 140, at 67-68 (same).
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profession to exclude all other license holders.1 42 Unique professional "turf'
prevents competition from other specialties, leading to higher prices and higher
monopoly rents for the professional. 143 Thus the fact that the Colorado State
Board of Licensure for Architects, Professional Engineers, and Professional
Land Surveyors promulgates rules of practice that reinforce the separateness of
each profession may itself be a function of anticompetitive behavior by the
board.'" The members face a tension between maximizing joint returns and
taking the largest slice for themselves, but this is true of any cartel.1 45 As has
been observed in a slightly different context, "[a]bsence of actual competition
may simply be a manifestation of the anticompetitive agreement itself." 46
2.

On the Margin: ProfessionalsLicensed by a DifferentBoard and
Inactive Professionals

As I have discussed, board members holding an active license in a
profession regulated by the board itself should be considered "active market
participants" for purposes of antitrust immunity, but what about members who
hold a license in a profession regulated by a different board? When courts
confront this question, they will face a difficult line-drawing exercise. Perhaps
all licensees have a general affinity for anticompetitive regulation, having
benefited from it in their own specialty, and so a physician on a chiropractor
board,' 47 or an engineer on an architecture board,14 8 may go along with the selfdealing of the other members. Yet because there is no formal opportunity for
actual quid pro quo, courts should not count licensees governed by other boards
toward a board's dominance.
Not counting outside professionals as "active market participants" makes
sense because, in some cases, the outside professional's self-interest is adverse
142. See Jarod M. Bona, The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their
Own Exclusive Jurisdiction, 5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 28 (2011).
143. See KLEINER, supra note 5, at 59 (discussing price effects of licensing regulations as a form
of rent capture).
144. On this view, the Colorado Architecture Board has more successfully overcome its
coordination problems than the Georgia Counseling Board, which has not been able to create unique
turf for its licensees.
145. Even when competitors can agree that raising price together maximizes joint returns (i.e.,
they can agree on the size of the pie), they always have disparate interests when it comes to how to
allocate those returns (they disagree about how to slice it). See POSNER, supra note 140, at 59-60, 66
(noting that "[a]greeing on price alone may not be enough to get [a] cartel going" and explaining that a
successful cartel requires compromise among divergent interests). Yet it is no defense to a § 1 charge
that the competitors had disparate interests in some aspect of the enterprise; likewise, it should be no
defense in a mixed-board setting. Cf John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux: The Lysine Antitrust
Litigation, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 336, 336-46 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White
eds., 6th ed. 2014) (observing that the members of the infamous lysine cartel "squabbled frequently"
and that some were "strongly inclined to cheat on the price and market-share agreements").
146. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1149 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6553 (McKinney 2016).
148. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 339.2002 (2016) (providing for one seat on the architecture board
to be held by a professional engineer, and vice-versa).
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to the rest of the board members' profit motive. Outside board members often
come from an adjacent profession, 149 perhaps as a way to protect their own
profession from competitive encroachments. For example, it is easy to imagine
that the physician on a chiropractic board will advocate against chiropractor
licensing rules that put chiropractors in competition with physicians, such as
orthopedists. If the outsider is successful in stopping chiropractors from
enlarging their scope of practice to tread on the physicians' professional turf, that
success may have anticompetitive consequences in the market for medicine, but
not for chiropractic services. At least for the regulation of chiropractors, the
physician's self-interest is opposed to the self-dealing tendencies of the
chiropractors. And without an opportunity for the chiropractors to cooperate with
the physician on their board,150 there is little incentive for the physician member
to "play nice" with the chiropractors.
The membership of retired professionals raises similar questions as that of
outside professionals. In both cases, there may be a general affinity for
professional self-dealing, but in both cases there is no possibility of an actual
quid pro quo arrangement. Retired professionals have permanently given up their
financial self-interest in anticompetitive regulation, and so should fall outside
(albeit barely) of the Court's requirement that "active market participants" be
supervised to enjoy immunity.15 1 To hold otherwise would invite an inquiry into
how much professional experience is too much, which comes uncomfortably
close to an inquiry into the subjective motivation and mental state of a board
member. 152 "Retirement," however, ought to be defined as the permanent
relinquishment of a license. A scheme that allows board members to temporarily
suspend their licenses with an easy path to reinstatement after service would be
too close to currently practicing professionals."' Such a board member merely
forestalls the personal financial benefit from self-dealing; he does not relinquish
it.

149. See FLA. STAT. § 468.703 (2016) (chiropractor to serve on athletic trainer board); MINN.
STAT. § 148.67 (2016) (physician to serve on physical therapy board); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4763.02
(West 2016) (real estate broker to serve on real estate appraiser board); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1-104
(West 2016) (attorney to serve on accountancy board); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 402.051 (West 2016)
(otolaryngologist to serve on hearing instrument fitters advisory board).
150. I found no instances where a professional did double duty on his own professional board
and that of an adjacent occupation.
151. N.C. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (emphasis added).
152. The difficulty of such an inquiry was a reason why using "capture" as a test for whether state
regulation was immune from antitrust laws-a position advocated in the 1980s and never adopted by
the Court-was rejected as too unwieldy. Compare John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of
Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713, 724-26 (1986) (advocating for a capture element in the
test for antitrust immunity) with Elhauge, supra note 87 (arguing that a capture test is hopelessly
unwieldy and does not describe the case law).
153. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 122, at 7 (opining that a
practitioner who has temporarily suspended his license is an active market participant).
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Case-by-Case or Safe Harbors?

Defining "active market participant" as one licensed by the board itself
avoids a case-by-case inquiry into whether the decision makers had an incentive
to suppress competition in taking this particularregulatory action. A contrary
rule-one that would define board dominance with reference to the particular
challenged act-has several distinct disadvantages. Most importantly, it would
require such fact-intensive inquiries into members' business affairs as to make
the legal status of a board virtually unpredictable. In contrast, a bright-line rule
recognizing "active market participants" as license holders would allow states to
be confident that properly comprised boards are immune from antitrust suit.
Courts are likely to interpret North CarolinaDental in such a way to allow states
to use board composition-and not just supervision-as a means to confer
immunity; otherwise the Court's reference to "active market participants" would
have little meaning.
Similarly, defining "active market participants" with reference to the
challenged restriction would be too fact sensitive because it would require an
investigation into specific services provided by board members. For example,
consider the North Carolina Dental Board and its decision to "do battle" with
nondentist teeth whiteners. A restriction-by-restriction inquiry would ask
whether the dentist members actually offered teeth whitening, or perhaps
whether any of the members had future plans to do so, an inquiry that would be
hopelessly speculative. Further, determining the competitive scope of a
restriction for the purpose of defining "active market participant" would require
market definition, a notoriously fraught endeavor. 154
B.

"ControllingNumber" and the Mathematics of Control

In addition to the question of who contributes to professional dominance,
the North CarolinaDental opinion left open the question of how many market
participants is too many. The Court curiously used "controlling number" to
describe the level of practitioner dominance that triggers the supervision
requirement.155 The word choice is curious for two reasons. First, the precise
phrase "controlling number" does not appear in any of the briefs submitted in the
case; 156 it would seem the Court selected this phrase without guidance from

154. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010)
(arguing that "that there does not exist any coherent way to choose a relevant market without first
formulating one's best assessment of market power, whereas the entire rationale for the market definition
process is to enable an inference about market power").
155. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1114 (2015) (emphasis added).
156. See Brief for Respondent at 5, 29-34, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101 (2015) (No. 13-534) (using terms "decisive coalition," "majority," "controlling majority," and
"dominated" to describe dentists' influence over licensing board); Brief for Petitioner at 17, NC. State
Bd. ofDentalExam'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534) ("majority"); Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici
Curiae in Support of Respondent at 10-11, NC. State Bd ofDental Exam 'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13534) ("decisive coalition"); Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen, Inc., in Support of Respondent at 14,
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parties or amici. Second, "controlling number" suggests "majority," but because
the Court avoided that simpler word, it implies that "controlling number" can, at
least under some circumstances, mean something other than a majority. 157 This
Section explores the possible meanings of this phrase, ultimately advocating for
a meaning that is simple and formal, but that also accounts for the Court's use of
such a beguiling phrase.
1.

Possible Meanings of "Control"

Although "controlling number" does not appear in any of the briefs, the
notion of "control" abounds, most especially in the FTC's briefs and its opinions
below.' 58 The FTC notion of control is capacious, and can include situations
where the "active market participants" are in the minority. In guidelines issued
after North Carolina Dental, the FTC opined that situations where the board
habitually defers to the minority license-holding members would require
supervision. 159 The FTC called for "a fact-bound inquiry that must be made on a
case-by-case basis."l 60 As is the case for fact-intensive inquiries into "active
market participant," the cost of case-by-case determinations of "control" is high:
the unpredictability of such a rule would effectively eliminate the option of using
board composition to ensure immunity.
Before rejecting such an all-things-considered inquiry, it is necessary to
consider its benefits, which are significant. Even minority license holders can be
a powerful voice on a board. A group of decision makers with heterogeneous
backgrounds and knowledge are likely to defer to the opinion of those with (or
appearing to have) more information; in situations where decisions are made
deliberatively, these effects can be large. 16 1 The licensees on a board, as current
practitioners of a specialized craft or service, will likely be seen as having special
information. To the extent boards are vulnerable to "bandwagon" effects or
information cascades, even a small fraction of licensees could determine

N.C. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534) ("majority voting power"); Brief of
Amici Curiae State of West Virginia et al. in Support of Petitioner at i,N.C. StateBd. ofDentalExam'rs,
135 S. Ct. 1101 (No. 13-534) ("majority").
This issue was raised by the dissent in North CarolinaDental. See N C. State Bd ofDental
157.
Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. at 1123 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("What is a 'controlling number'? Is it a majority?
And if so, why does the Court eschew that term?").
158. See In the Matter of the N.C. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 151 F.T.C. 607, 626 (2011) (holding
that "a state regulatory body that is controlled by participants in the very industry it purports to regulate
must satisfy both prongs of Midcal to be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the state action
doctrine"); Brief for Respondent, NC. State Bd. ofDental Exam'rs, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13534).
159.

See FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, supra note 122, at 8-9.

160. Id.
161. See Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1,
31-32 (2009) (discussing information cascades and the ways in which deliberative decision making can
lead to this and other examples of "group think").
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regulatory outcomes. 162 Even without the persuasion of expertise, a minority
faction with united interests can yield significant influence over decisions when
it is the largest faction among several. 163 A case-by-case rule would allow courts
to capture such examples where the self-interest of licensees dominates board
decision making, even where licensees do not dominate the board's composition.
Corporate law, for example, captures the benefits of a flexible rule in
determining whether a party is a "controlling shareholder." 1 6
But as other areas of law have recognized, there is value in using bright
lines to define "control." The "one person, one vote" doctrine of constitutional
law dictates some approximation of proportional representation in local
government, but the Court has pointedly refused to use an all-things-considered
standard to measure whether a particular population was heard in governmental
decisions. The landmark case is Board of Estimate ofNew York City v. Morris,
which rejected the notion that determining the proportionality of representation
should rest on something other than a simple mathematical formula based on
population. 165 It explained that the "one person, one vote" rule "does not attempt
to inquire whether, in terms of how the legislature actually works in practice, the
districts have equal power to affect a legislative outcome," reasoning that "[t]his
66
would be a difficult and ever-changing task."
The one-person-one-vote cases provide a close analogy, and suggest that
board dominance should be assessed mathematically. These cases concern
regulatory decision making, as do the state action immunity cases. Regulators
almost always act with mixed motives, because they operate under a complex set
of imperatives. Layering on a case-by-case inquiry into how power and influence
are actually exerted would expand the arguments available on either side to an
almost limitless set, leaving the rule with little content at all. In the same way
162. See Adrian Vermeule, The Parliament of the Experts, 58 DUKE L.J. 2231, 2255 (2009)
(discussing the problem of deference to the few in the context of federal regulatory decision making).
163. For example, at the end of the 2010-2015 British Parliament, the Conservative Party had
302 out of a total 650 seats; they were in the minority. But because they held such a large number of
seats, they could be said to "control" the government. They could form a ruling coalition by aligning
with just one other party--either the Labour Party or the Liberal Democrats (they did the latter). But for
the Conservatives to not be in the ruling faction, the other members of parliament would have had to
combine the interests of at least four parties-for example, by forming an unlikely alliance among the
Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats, the Democratic Unionists, and the Scottish National Party. See
Current State of the Parties, U.K. PARLAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-andoffices/mps/current-state-of-the-parties [https://penna.cc/7MSJ-F75B]. The simple rule that a minority
faction does not "control" a decision-making body would not recognize the Conservative Party's
extreme degree of influence in forming England's 2015 government.
164. A "controlling shareholder"-a status that creates a fiduciary duty toward the other
shareholders-can apply to parties holding less than 50 percent of outstanding shares. See, e.g., Kahn v.
Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1113-15 (Del. 1994). In Kahn, the court cited the facts that
there was a long history of the minority faction getting its way in board decisions (despite holding only
five of eleven seats) and that the faction's representative "scared [the majority members] to death." See
id.
165. See Bd. of Estimate of N.Y. v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
166. Id. at 699.
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that it is undesirable to have a constitutional inquiry turn on whether a city board
of estimate acted to benefit one borough because it was "controlled" by that
borough's representatives or because it was acting in a public-regarding manner,
it would be undesirable to have antitrust immunity turn on an inquiry into the
persuasiveness of certain board members. 167
A mathematical understanding of control explains the Court's curious
addition of the word "number" to the control standard advocated by the FTC.
While "controlling number" suggests something other than a majority, it also
implies that, for a given board making a given decision, there is a "number"
which will designate control. Alternate phrases such as "controlling faction" or
"controlling interest" could have been used if the Court had in mind a factintensive inquiry into control.
2.

The Mathematics of "Control"

What is the "number" that will establish control, and why didn't the Court
use "majority" in its holding? The findings of my research suggest that
procedural rules such as voting and quorum rules could allow boards that are not
intrinsically dominated by statute to nevertheless make decisions with a majority
of licensees. The standard for "controlling number" ought to be mathematical
and objective, not an all-things-considered inquiry into the intangible influence
of the professionals-but it ought to consider the procedural maneuvers that may
turn a minority of license holders into a decision-making majority. Essentially,
"control" should be found when license holders, voting as a bloc, can determine
a board's vote without assent from nonprofessional members. Only in the
simplest case (where the full board votes and every member has an equal vote)
will "controlling number" be synonymous with "majority."
If a board has a minority of license holders, but has quorum rules that allow
decisions to be made by less than the full board, a decision could easily be made
by a "controlling number" of licensees. Decisions so made, unless actively
supervised, should be subject to antitrust liability. For example, a nursing board
comprised by statute of four nurses, two physicians, and two consumer
members-but allowing a quorum with a majority of the board 1 68-may appear
nondominated, yet in fact could make all its decisions with a majority of

167. This all-things-considered inquiry would be too close to a capture test for antitrust immunity
that was never adopted by the Court and discredited by Professor Elhauge. See supra note 152 and
sources cited therein. Cf Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justif More Intrusive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 49 (1991) (arguing that capture theory cannot justify changes in judicial
review because of the lack of a normative baseline for how much interest group influence is too much).
168. This is a very common quorum rule. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-20-202(b) (2016) ("A
majority of the board shall constitute a quorum and may perform and exercise all the duties and powers
devolving upon it.").
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nurses.1 69 A decision made at a meeting with four nurses and one physician
attending should need supervision to enjoy immunity.
Another practice leading to dominance even on a mixed board is the use of
committees. Some boards divide regulatory authority among subunits of the
board: for example, the Texas Board of Nursing delegates authority over
professional admission and discipline to a subcommittee.1 7 0 Although license
holders do not dominate the nursing board as a whole, the Eligibility and
Disciplinary Committee consists of two nurses and one lay member.171 Decisions
made by this subcommittee ought to be subject to the supervision requirement.
Boards can achieve a similar effect by assigning different voting rights to
different members. Some boards allow only professional members to vote on
certain matters, typically competitively sensitive decisions such as admissions
standards and ethical rules.1 72 Where this is true, only voting members should be
counted toward the dominance of a particular decision.
IV.
WHAT'S NEXT FOR THE STATES: THE CASE FOR UNIFORMITY

States must act soon, as 1,515 boards are potentially vulnerable to the kinds
of antitrust suits that are currently working their way through the district courts.
North Carolina Dental leaves states with two options to confer immunity on
currently dominated boards: states can either supervise board decision making
or alter board composition to avoid professional dominance. This Part explains
why altering professional dominance on boards may be an attractive alternative
to supervision, and how states could practically achieve such a change. It also
suggests that states strive for uniformity among their own boards and with other
states.

169. The North Dakota Board of Physical Therapy is such an example. Because of frequent
absences by nonlicensee members, 66 percent of its meetings since July 2013-and 100 percent of them
since November 2015-have been dominated by licensees. See BoardMinutes, N.D. BD. OF PHYSICAL
THERAPY, https://www.ndbpt.org/minutes.asp [https://perma.cc/2RAC-NLTD]. Only one of these
meetings appeared to lack a quorum, which by law is a majority of the board. See N.D. CENT. CODE §
43-26.1-03 (2016).
170. See 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 211.6 (2016) (vesting nurse-dominated disciplinary committee
with "authority to determine all matters of eligibility for licensure and discipline of [licensees]")
(emphasis added).
171. See id.
172. For example, the Indiana State Board of Funeral and Cemetery Service prohibits four of its
nonlicensee members from voting on any matters related to licensing of funeral directors. See IND. CODE
§ 25-15-9-11 (2016). The Arkansas Psychology Board prohibits its lay members from voting on matters
pertaining to the licensing exam. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-97-201 (West 2016). The South Carolina
State Board of Dentistry prohibits its dental hygienist member from voting on matters related to the
dentist-licensing exam; the board's lay member may not vote on either dental or hygiene examinations.

See S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-15-20 (2016).
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Supervision

As I have argued elsewhere, providing dominated boards with adequate
state supervision could be a good way to avoid antitrust liability for board
members. 173 Its benefits include centralization-one umbrella supervisor could
theoretically review all licensing board activity. 174 It also may be the best way to
ensure accountability, which the Court sees as the most important feature of
decisions entitled to immunity.' 75 Supervision would promote accountability by
ensuring that politically visible state actors examine, approve, and own board
regulations, addressing the principal-agent problem between the state and
licensing boards. 176

Yet supervision has some distinct disadvantages that states should consider.
The biggest disadvantage to relying on supervision to immunize boards is that
the Court has been unclear about what constitutes adequate supervision. The
ambiguities created by the "controlling number of. . . active market
participants" phrase from North Carolina Dental are minor compared to the
vagaries of the Court's "active supervision" jurisprudence.' 7 7 Supervision is
therefore a risky route to immunity, and for that reason alone states may prefer
immunizing boards by altering their composition.
Even setting aside legal uncertainty, there are other reasons a state may
prefer using board composition as a route to immunity. Supervisory structures
must expose board activity to the discipline of electoral politics in order to
comport with the Court's new antitrust federalism and its focus on states taking
the political heat for self-regulation it directs or permits. Creating such a
politically accountable actor within the infrastructure of state government would
require significant political capital and financial expenditures, and may lead to
bureaucratic ossification.
First, creating an accountable supervisory structure will at least involve
passing legislation and may require state constitutional amendment. Using the
executive branch to supervise requires legislation giving the Governor the
authority to review, veto, and modify board decisions before enactment, as

173. See Allensworth, supra note 74, at 1435-44.
174. For example, Colorado houses its licensing boards under the Department of Regulatory
Affairs (DORA), which employs policy experts and economists tasked with reviewing licensing rules
for efficiency. DORA is perhaps a ready-made supervisor, although it would need new statutory
authority to modify or veto the rules it reviews. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-4-103 (West 2016)
(describing DORA's rule review process).
175. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992) (holding that immunity is
appropriate only where states "accept political responsibility for actions they intend to undertake," and
noting that "[fjederalism serves to assign political responsibility, not to obscure it").
176. See Allensworth, supra note 74, at 1424.
177. See id. at 1434; Rosenstein supra note 89, at 334 (observing that "[d]efining the 'active
supervision' requirement ... has proven to be problematic").

2017]

FOXES AT THE HENHO USE

1603

Georgia has recently done in the wake of North CarolinaDental."' And if the
legislature wishes to create a special agency or division responsible for
supervision-which would be reasonable given the amount of regulation a
supervisor will have to review-legislation would be required to create that
entity. If states choose to use a legislative committee to supervise licensing
boards, states may have to amend their constitutions to allow a legislative veto;
otherwise, that committee would lack the ability to "modify or veto" that
supervisors must have. 179 Altering board membership would also require
legislation, but it may require less political capital than adding a layer of
regulatory bureaucracy and further delegating power to the executive.
Second, immunizing boards through supervision will be financially costly
for states. The supervisor would have a significant docket if all board decisionsfrom rules of ethics to individual license decisions-are to be reviewed carefully
for substance. The supervisor would need significant resources and staff to
function. 180 And unlike a licensing board that can generate revenue through
application and renewal fees from licensees,181 the supervisory entity will not be
able to pay for itself.
Finally, supervision may be an unattractive alternative because it could be
perceived as adding to delay and ossification in occupational regulation. An extra
layer of review will may make professional regulation slower and less nimble
than states prefer. Substantive supervision necessarily involves some duplication
182
In states where small
of effort and analysis, creating the risk of inefficiencies.
adding another layer
as
be
seen
government is prized, supervisory structures may
of red tape.

178. See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-1C-3(a) (West 2016) (giving the Governor the "authority and duty
to actively supervise the professional licensing boards of this state," including the right to "[r]eview . .
approve or veto any rule before it is filed").
179. Constitutional amendment was necessary, for example, in Connecticut when it created a
rules review committee within its legislature. See Legislative Regulation Review Committee, CONN.
GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.cga.ct.gov/rr [https://perma.cc/6LXK-W878] (explaining that "[i]t is the
responsibility of the Legislative Regulation Review Committee to review regulations proposed by state
agencies and approve them before regulations are implemented"). Without the ability to bypass
bicameralism and presentment requirements, the rules review committee could not meaningfully review
administrative rules. See Rossi, supra note 99, at 1202-03 (discussing the state Chadha problem and
Connecticut's constitutional amendment).
180. Colorado's Department of Regulatory Affairs, for example, has almost 600 full-time
employees and a total budget of $88.5 million. The Division of Professions and Occupations alone has
202 full-time employees and an annual budget of $17.7 million. See DEP'T OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
ORGANIzATION CHART, https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B6RhHT-_h2_eOVE2RIEbkNMMmc/view
[https://perma.cc/64EK-3JDZ].
See MORRIS M. KLEINER, W.E. UPJOHN INST. FOR EMP'T RESEARCH, GUILD-RIDDEN
181.
LABOR MARKETS: THE CURIOUS CASE OF OCCUPATIONAL LIcENSING 14 (2015) (observing that

licensing boards typically make rather than spend state money).
182. Several states argued as amici in North Carolina Dental that supervision would lead to
bureaucratic inefficiencies. See Brief for West Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
15, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534) (describing
supervision as "inefficient," "duplicative," and "cumbersome").
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This is not to say that, in the final analysis, state supervision is an inferior
alternative to altering board composition. Rather, I point out its shortcomings to
highlight the importance of considering-and understanding-the options states
have at the board level without resort to supervision.
B. Altering Board Composition and the Value of Other Voices
If a nondominated board does not need state supervision to enjoy antitrust
immunity, then who should serve as the other board members? Although the
identity of the other board members does not influence the antitrust immunity
inquiry-so long as they are not "active market participants"-states should take
board reformation as an opportunity to improve the substance of occupational
regulation. To that end, the current paradigm, where the nonprofessional
members have no particular expertise in the interests they ostensibly represent,
should be abandoned.
Further, licensing boards ought to represent more than just consumer and
elderly interests. It is common for a licensing-board statute to refer to a
"consumer member" or a "member representing the elderly,"1 8 3 but there is little
effort to fill these slots with actual experts in consumer or elderly needs.1 84
Rather, the fact that someone has consumed the service before, or that someone
happens to be over sixty years of age, somehow qualifies members for these
spots. These members have, at best, only anecdotal evidence of what consumers

183. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-103-201(c)(4)(A) (2016) (appointing one member who is "sixty
(60) years of age or older" to "represent the elderly" on the board of social work); N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
8213(1) (McKinney 2016) (appointing three members to acupuncture board to "represent[] the
consumer and community"); 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-45-1(a)(2) (2016) (appointing two members ofboard
of nursing home administrators to represent "senior citizen groups"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-4-102(a)
(2016) (establishing board of chiropractic examiners with two "consumer members"); WASH. REV.
CODE § 18.52.040 (2016) (appointing, to board of nursing home administrators, a person who "shall be
a resident of a nursing home or a family member of a resident or a person eligible for medicare.").
184. The sole consumer member of the New York State Board for Acupuncture appears to have
no past experience advocating on behalf of consumers; she describes herself as an "[e]xperienced
administrator, educator and information specialist" with a "[flocus on instructional videoconferencing
and online learning." Denise Graminski, LINKEDIN, https://www.linkedin.com/in/dmgraminski
[https://permacc/U7YM-U9BS]; see Statutory Composition & Current Membership, N.Y. STATE
EDUC. DEP'T, http://www.op.nysed.gov/boards/bdcomp.htm [https://perma.cc/8MY9-DKEB] (scroll to
"Acupuncture"). The three public members of the Texas State Board of Acupuncture Examiners include
an interior designer, a retired elementary school teacher, and the president of a construction companynone of whom claim past experience advocating on behalf of consumers. See Acupuncture BoardBios,
TEX. MED. BD., http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/page/acupuncture-board-bios [https://perma.cc/HQW3GUJ7]. The Rhode Island Board of Examiners for Nursing Home Administrators, on the other hand,
appears to have left both of its "senior citizen" seats vacant for the past three years. See Board of
Examiners
for
Nursing
Home
Administrators,
R-I.
DEP'T
OF
STATE,
http://sos.ri.gov/govdirectory/index.php?page=DetailDeptAgency&eid=251
[https://perna.cc/TP24KSAM] (scroll to "Recently Submitted Meeting Minutes"). See also About the Board, OR.
OCCUPATIONAL THERAPY LICENSING BD., http://www.oregon.gov/otlb/Pages/About-the-Board.aspx
[https://perma.cc/W452-VVYL] (describing the two public members of the occupational-therapy board
as having past personal experience with occupational therapy, but citing no experience advocating for
consumers).
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and the elderly need. Occupational licensing involves trade-offs between service
quality and service price and availability.18 1 Professional board members may
have expertise in service quality, but tend not to understand the costs-in terms
of price and availability-that may be associated with a restriction aimed at
improving quality. Here, someone with expertise in economics, or at least some
experience advocating for consumer rights, could help identify the likely costs
of a restriction.
Finding economists or experienced consumer advocates willing to serve on
a licensing board is a challenge, but it is not insurmountable. First, the current
compensation paid to board members, which is typically a per diem stipend,' 86
could be raised, at least for those who need the incentive to serve. Increasing the
remuneration may help attract the desired expertise, and may cost the state less
than other reforms, such as creating a supervisory agency. And if the cost savings
associated with more efficient occupational regulation were added to the
calculation, pay increases for those with expertise may be a net money saver for
states.
If increasing pay is not a viable option for augmenting the level of expertise
on a licensing board, states could use some of their own staff to serve as ex
officio members of boards. It is relatively common for a department head to
serve as a member of a licensing board. For example, in Kentucky, the
commissioner of public health serves ex officio on the State Board of Medical
Licensure.' 8 7 But there is typically at most one ex officio member on a licensing
board, in part because that member is a high-ranking government official and
there may not be enough of those to cover many boards. Still, states could pack
their licensing boards with staff-level government workers who have the
necessary policy experience or even economic expertise to represent
188

consumers.

At best, current licensing boards represent consumer and practitioner
interests, but there are other groups of stakeholders that should have seats at the
table. As governmental and media reports have recently documented, licensing

185. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 70, at 1111-16 (discussing the trade-offs of licensing
regulation).
186. See ALA. CODE § 34-11-32 (2016) (setting per diem for members of board of professional
engineers and land surveyors at $100 for time spent on board matters and necessary travel); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 10-8-4 (2016) (setting per diem for nonsalaried public officers at $95.00 "for each board or
committee meeting attended"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 1010(b) (2016) (setting per diem for members
of professional licensing boards at $50.00 per day "for each day devoted to official duties").
187. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.530 (West 2016); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 340.202
(2016) (state veterinarian serves ex officio on veterinary board); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 310-A:120
(2016) (state geologist serves ex officio on board of professional geologists); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 3339-104 (2016) (director of real estate commission serves ex officio on real estate appraiser board).
188. These members should have full voting privileges, unlike many ex officio posts that are
explicitly nonvoting seats. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-102-201(a)(4)(B) (West 2016) ("However,
the ex officio member shall have no vote, shall not serve as an officer of the board, and shall not be
counted to establish a quorum or a majority necessary to conduct business.").

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

1606

[Vol. 105:1567

9
restrictions impose especially heavy burdens on military families'8 and ex190
offenders.
And some specific occupations may impose costs on a particular
community-for example, African-style hair braiders have been significantly
disadvantaged by cosmetology boards attempting to regulate their craft, creating
a special burden on communities of African immigrants.1 91 States should strive
to identify the sometimes multifarious interests implicated by a board's
regulatory activity, and bring some of those voices to the boardroom.

Adding other voices to the regulatory conversation does not mean
eliminating the participation of professionals. Licensees are uniquely positioned
to understand the risks of low-quality service, and to anticipate how a restriction
will impact their profession.' 92 As Justice Breyer noted in oral argument for
North Carolina Dental, a state may quite reasonably want a "group of brain
surgeons to decide who can practice brain surgery in this State ... [and not] want
a group of bureaucrats deciding that." 93 As long as the professional members do
not exceed half of the decision-making quorum, their expertise can be used
without fear of antitrust liability. Licensing board reform should focus not on
eliminating all professional input into regulation, but on curtailing de facto
professional self-regulation.
C.

Setting Board Voting and Quorum Rules by Statute

As discussed above, board composition is only half of the puzzle, since
quorum and voting rules can allow even a minority of professional members to
make decisions on behalf of the board. States seeking a safe harbor for their
unsupervised licensing boards should set procedural rules that eliminate this
possibility. At present, it is common for the statute creating an occupational

189.
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MILITARY SKILLS FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE:
LEVERAGING MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPERIENCE TO PUT VETERANS AND MILITARY SPOUSES

BACK
TO
WORK
20-21
(2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/veteransreport 5-31-2012.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7RXN-YDXN] (describing First Lady Michelle Obama's "Joining Forces" initiative).
190. See Bryant Jackson-Green, How OccupationalLicensing Blocks Path to Success for ExOffenders, ILL. POL'Y (Apr. 7, 2015), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/how-occupational-licensingblocks-path-to-success-for-ex-offenders [https://perma.ec/RF7K-TG6U] (arguing that professions
barring felons create irrational barriers to entrepreneurial and employment opportunities for exoffenders).
191. See Jacob Goldstein, So You Think You Can Be a HairBraider?,N.Y. TIMES MAG. (June
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/so-you-think-you-can-be-a-hair12,
braider.htm-l [https://perma.cc/3JGE-HZ2L] (discussing the burdens of cosmetology licensing
requirements on African hair braiders).
192.
COSTS

See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, BUREAU OF ECON., THE
AND
BENEFITS
OF
OCCUPATIONAL
REGULATION
ix
(1990),
http://

www.ramblemuse.com/articles/cox foster.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JUU-5CXL] (noting that "although
professions may have superior technical expertise in establishing and evaluating restrictions designed to
raise quality, professionals often have a financial interest in self regulation").
193. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct.
1101
(No. 13-534),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/13534_16hl.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7HM-6B3P].
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licensing board to give the board the authority to create its own procedural
rules.1 94 This leaves many board decisions potentially vulnerable to antitrust suit.
Only through statutorily-mandated rules of procedure can a state be sure that a
nondominated board will create immune regulation.
Board procedure rules should ensure that decisions cannot be made by a
majority of licensees. First, states should require that a meeting quorum depend
not only on how many board members are present, but on the license status of
those present.1 95 The rules should make clear that a quorum is not obtained when
licensees represent the majority of those at the meeting. Second, the rules should
specify that all board members have equal votes on all areas of decision making,
and that decisions carry with a simple majority.1 96 Third, the rules should specify
that license holders may not dominate any committees delegated regulatory
tasks. If states enshrine these procedural rules in their statutes, states can be sure
that any board decision that comports with state law is also immune from federal
antitrust law.
D.

The Value of Uniformity

With 1,790 boards operating in America, it is safe to say that professional
licensing is a fractured system of regulation. Without opining on the general
merits of such a decentralized system (as opposed to, say, a federal system of
licensing for each profession), it is worth observing that some standardization of
board composition-within a state and among the states-would have
tremendous benefits.
Uniformity within a state would give that state confidence that if one board
is immune, they all are immune and should not be subject to board-by-board
litigation over whether supervision is required. States hoping to use board
composition to avoid antitrust liability will need to reform most of their boards
anyway; they should take the opportunity to reform all licensing boards along
similar lines. If each board has the same proportion of practitioners-less than
half, if states wish to use board composition to avoid antitrust suits-then states
can expect all their boards to receive similar legal treatment by a federal antitrust

194. The South Carolina Board ofArchitectural Examiners, for example, is empowered to "adopt
rules governing its proceedings." S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-3-60 (2016).
195. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 468E-6 (2016) (setting quorum for speech pathology and audiology
board at four members, provided that "in no instance shall a meeting of the [licensees] ... alone be
considered a quorum."). But see S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-1225(C) (2016) (setting quorum for eightperson anesthesiology assistant licensing committee at a "majority of the members" in office, "not less
than two of whom must be physician members.").
196. Majority rules are the norm. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-57-9(2) (2016) ("a majority
of the required quorum is sufficient" to take action by vote); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 34.5(c) (West
2016) (specifying that "no action shall be taken at any meeting" without majority support); W. VA. CODE
§ 30-3-6 (2016) (majority vote of a quorum necessary to transact business, except for disciplinary
actions). States should avoid requiring supermajorities or allowing veto power for any given board
members. These rules complicate the antitrust analysis and are likely to be used to boost professional
influence on decision making.
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court. The identity of the remaining board members will likely be different for
each board, because each profession may implicate unique interests and need a
different balance of representation. However, because North Carolina Dental
has made immunity turn on the proportion of professionals, variance among
boards in how the remaining seats are filled will probably not introduce much
legal uncertainty.
Interstate differences in board membership present a slightly different
question. Typically, differences among states in their regulatory responses to
problems are seen as a good thing because they encourage experimentation
among states for the optimal regulatory infrastructure. 197 On the other hand,
interstate uniformity has some distinct advantages, at least for individual states.
When it comes to crafting responses to the legal crisis precipitated by North
Carolina Dental, states may find that there is wisdom in crowds. On this view,
states should collaborate on a uniform board-membership solution that could be
adopted by any state hoping to avoid antitrust liability for its occupational
boards. If the Court upholds one state's scheme, it could provide widespread
assurance to others. Providing out-of-the-box solutions to states, model
legislation has been successful in other areas, such as state Administrative
98
Procedure Acts, and could be developed to similar success here.'
One more benefit of uniformity should be identified, although it inheres
more to the public than to individual states. Uniformity of licensing boards would
make them easier to study and understand, giving policy analysts and economists
a better picture of how the professions are regulated and the effect of those
regulations. This would increase our knowledge about this powerful regulatory
institution and enable crucial research into its costs and benefits. Further, it
would increase the public's awareness of how the professions are regulated and
inform the political process, which may in turn curb professional self-dealing.
At present, the fact that no two boards are alike has contributed to each board's
relative obscurity and has suppressed public outrage at what is, at present, a
system of self-dealing and regulatory waste.

&

197. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism,26 J.L.
ECON. 23, 34-35 (1983) (describing the value of competition among diverse jurisdictions).
198. The U.S. Department of Labor recently made $7.5 million available to states in grant money
for occupational licensing reform. Some of this grant money could be used to develop board membership
templates, along with substantive reforms of licensing requirements. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMP'T
& TRAINING ADMIN., NOI-ETA-16-14, NOTICE OF INTENT TO FUND PROJECT ON OCCUPATIONAL

LICENSING REVIEW AND PORTABILITY (2016), https://www.doleta.gov/grants/pdf/NOI-ETA-1614.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DZ5-25MJ].
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CONCLUSION

The invisibility of state boards has allowed a rapid and in many cases
unjustifiable expansion of occupational licensing in the United States. The
accretion of newly licensed professions, the intensification of entry
requirements, and the enlargement of the scope of practice for existing
professions have been conducted one board meeting at a time, in what resembles
the proverbial smoke-filled rooms of traditional cartels. This Article puts those
boards, their membership, and their procedures under a microscope so that we
can better understand how, and by whom, almost a third of American workers
are regulated. The picture is one of almost total self-regulation with little to no
state governmental involvement. This is disturbing not only because a recent
Supreme Court case makes this form of regulation vulnerable to federal antitrust
liability, but because it defies what any reasonable citizen would expect out of
governmentally-sanctioned regulation that redistributes wealth to the regulated,
keeps others from earning a living, and costs consumers billions of dollars per
year. If states are unable or unwilling to meaningfully supervise this selfregulation, they should reform their boards to eliminate the dominance of those
who have the most to gain from restricting competition: the professionals
themselves.
APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Total
Boards

Total
Dominated
Boards

Total
Mixed
Boards

Percent
Dominated

Percent
Dominated
Excluding
Mixed

Alabama

49

42

3

86%

80%

Alaska

20

18

6

90%

60%

Arizona

27

23

4

85%

70%

Arkansas
California

48
34

33
16

3
3

69%
47%

63%
38%

Colorado

25

20

2

80%

72%

Connecticut

31

26

9

84%

55%

Delaware

37

32

10

86%

59%

State

Florida

38

35

7

92%

74%

Georgia

32

28

2

88%

81%

Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas

28
42
37
31
33

21
38
34
23
29

4
4
6
4
5

75%
90%
92%
74%
88%

61%
81%
76%
61%
73%

19

17

6

89%

58%
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68%
81%
68%

36

9
2

89%
86%

37
34

31
30

6
4

84%
88%

Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska

37
35
32

29
35
25

7
1
6

78%
100%
78%

59%
97%
59%

32
37
33
31

31
33
27
25

4
7
10

97%
89%
82%

84%
70%
52%

Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico

40
47
48
33

33
39
37
30

7
7
9
6
6

81%
83%
83%
77%
91%

58%
65%
64%
65%
73%

New York
North Carolina
North Dakota

28
45
40

Ohio
Oklahoma

35
38

24
40
33
30
32

6
5
5
7
6

86%
89%
83%
86%
84%

64%
78%
70%
66%

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina

39
28

59%
71%
66%

33
36
49
48
38
26

7
4
7
5
2
6
10
5
5
6

77%
86%
84%

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia

30
24
32
38
31
36
36
42
32
21

90%
94%
100%
73%
88%
84%
81%

79%
88%
83%
53%
77%
71%
58%

Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

36
33
29
36

30
30
27
32

3
4
8
6

83%

75%

91%
93%
89%

79%
66%
72%

National Totals

1790

1515

276

85%

69%

39

Louisiana

44
42

Maine
Maryland

Kentucky

38
42

76%

68%

